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I . INTRODUCTION
Good faith is a general principle of law recognized by
almost all civil law countries and a number of common law
countries.' The Vienna Sales Convention" introduces this
principle in its general provision Article 7(1). Article
7(1) states that "in the interpretation of the Convention,
regard is to be had ... to the need to promote . . . the
observance of good faith in international trade." 3 A novice
might be surprised to find that "good faith" is
incorporated in a provision dealing with the interpretation
of the Convention. At first glance at least, this placement
of the requirement of good faith suggests that it is
directed to the courts, rather than to contracting
"See Newman, The General Principles of Equity, in Equity In The World's
Legal Systems 589, 600 (R. Newman ed. 1978). Newman states that good
faith principle "is in accordance with the code of fair play of
everyday ethics, is written into the civil codes in almost all civil-
law systems and is thoroughly established in Anglo-American equity."
2Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, Annex I (1981)
[hereinafter Vienna Sales Convention, the Convention or CISG] . The
Convention first came into force on January 1, 1988 and it governs the
sale of goods between private parties whose places of business are in
different nations and whose nations are Contracting Parties to the
Convention. As of May 19, 1995, forty-five countries, which account
for over two-thirds of all world trade, had become parties to the
Convention
.
Id. art. 7(1). This provision reads in full, "In the interpretation of
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade."
1
parties. 4 Our novice may feel more perplexed when he can
not find a definition or any explanation with regard to the
good faith concept in the whole text of the Convention.
This perplexity, similarly encountered by judges,
necessarily gives rise to problems in applying the
Convention's good faith principle: what function does good
faith perform under the Convention? And what meaning should
be given to the good faith concept? We can hardly get
affirmative answers from the good faith provision itself.
The function and the concept of good faith within the
context of the Convention remain ambiguous and
controversial. Good faith is therefore considered as a
buried principle under the Convention."
Nevertheless, the good faith principle plays a
beneficial role in many contractual contexts. Businessmen
assume and even rely on the opposite party to act in good
faith throughout the course of their contractual dealings. 6
Trust and mutual confidence in good faith dealings are
In national laws, good faith is a requirement imposed on parties. See
eg., German Civil Code Section 242 states, "[t]he debtor is bound to
effect performance according to the requirements of good faith, giving
consideration to common usage."; Section 1-203 of the UCC provides
that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
Gyula Eorsi, General Provisions, in International Sales: The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods s 2.03 (N. Galston &
H. Smit eds.1984). Eorsi commented that ". . . as a compromise good
faith could survive but should be shifted to the provisions on
interpretation of the Convention, thus consigning it to a ghetto and
giving it an honorable burial."
See Max Weber, Economy and Society, volume 2, 637 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich ed., Bedminster Press 1968).
professed by international business partners. Good faith
has already been acknowledged as a shared value in
international trade. As the Vienna Sales Convention has
been rapidly occupying the field of international
commercial contracts with respect to the international sale
of goods," refinement of legal standards of good faith
under the Convention is of great significance for
fulfilling the Convention's role in governing international
sales transactions.
According to the Convention's uniform interpretation
principle, good faith should not be construed using notions
of good faith in national laws. 9 Nevertheless, good faith
is a concept originally rooted and evolved in national
laws. The Convention's drafters did not create this concept
in the international vacuum without referring to any
national elements of good faith. Therefore, understanding
of national approaches and experiences with regard to good
faith will provide a helpful background for discerning its
meaning and function under the Convention. Professor
Honnold suggests that construing good faith under the
Convention may be based on domestic elements that "reflect
a consensus -- a 'common core' of meaning" among national
Mary E. Hiscock, The Keeper of the Flame: Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in International Trade, 2 9 Loy . L.A.L. Rev. 1059, 1061(1996)
See supra note 2
.
9
John Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations
Convention (2d ed.1991) 147 (Stating " [t]he Convention's goal 'to
promote uniformity' should bar the use of purely local definitions
and concepts in construing the international text").
laws. :: Thus, a comparative study of good faith as applied
in the civil and common law systems and as treated in
UNIDROID Principles will lead us to a better understanding
of their counterpart under the Convention.
The purpose of this work is to propose a uniform
understanding of the Convention' s good faith principle by
clarifying its function, by setting forth its conceptual
boundaries, and by defining the scope of its related
obligations under the Convention. To lay ground work for
this, Chapter II reviews the drafting history of Article
7(1) which presents the legislative disputes leading to a
compromise good faith provision under the Convention. This
compromise provision merely formulates good faith as an
interpretation instrument. The discussion that follows
analyzes the impact of this compromise provision and argues
that good faith should also operate as imposing an
obligation on parties. Chapter II also addresses the
vagueness problem which stems from the aforementioned
indef initeness of the concept of good faith under the
Convention
.
This compromise and the conceptual vagueness problem
are rooted in the fundamental disagreement between the
civil and common law systems. To review the differing
treatments of good faith in the two systems, Chapter III
Id. For a similar affirmation, see Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law 31
(Wien, 1986) (stating that "[w]hether or not effective international
standards of good faith can actually be determined must be left to
studies in comparative law.")
first examines the principle of good faith as set forth in
the various civil law systems. These systems treat good
faith as an objective concept. Here the obligation of good
faith has been broadly imposed so that civil courts can use
this principle to pursue equitable results with
considerable flexibility. While common law systems, as
surveyed in Chapter IV, apply good faith more narrowly. A
scrutiny of this principle under the U.C.C. reveals two
things. First, the adoption of an objective standard of
commercial reasonableness has been the prevailing treatment
to good faith concept. Second, the imposition of the good
faith obligation should be limited to protecting reasonable
contractual expectations of the contracting parties. While
other major common law countries follow the U.C.C.
approach, England still has an unreceptive attitude to the
general principle of good faith.
Next, Chapter V examines the broad formulation of the
principle of good faith in UNIDROIT Principles, which
reflects the recent development with regard to good faith
at the international level.
Finally, Chapter VI returns to the Convention context
to construe a concept of good faith and define the scope
of good faith obligation based on the preceding "common
core" elements found in national laws and UNIDROIT
Principles. This Chapter then applies this understanding to
various situations which may arise under the Convention'
s
substantive provisions.
6The conclusion that follows is that good faith is a
highly desirable general principle and that national judges
should, and can save the buried "good faith" of the
Convention and develop it as a substantially uniform
principle in the international sales law.
II. GOOD FAITH PROVISION UNDER THE CONVENTION
A. A "compromise" result in Article 7(1)
By its terms, article 7(1) of the Convention deals
with the interpretation of the Convention. Why was "good
faith" placed in the strange location under the Convention?
This special arrangement is perhaps best understood in
light of the controversy which surrounded the drafting of
the provision.
The incorporation of good faith principle was an issue
subject to extensive disputes in the Convention's drafting
history. As early as the Hague Diplomatic Conference in
1964, explicit reference to good faith as a general
principle was opposed by the French delegate, Professor
Tunc, on the ground that that it might lead to divergent
and even arbitrary interpretations by national courts. 1 At
the 8th session of the UNCITRAL's Working Group in 1977, 13
the Hungarian delegation proposed the following new
provision for contract formation provisions: "In the course
of the formation of the contract the parties must observe
CISG art. 7(1). This provision emphasizes that the Convention must be
interpreted with regard for its special character and purpose.
1 Gyula Eorsi, A propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 348 (1983).
UNCITRAL, the abbreviation of United Nations Commission on
International Trade.
the principles of fair dealing and act in good faith."
Although the proposal was subsequently adopted by the
Working Group at its ninth session, it was rejected by a
majority of the UNCITRAL representatives. Representatives
who opposed the insertion of the provision noted that,
although good faith and fair dealing were highly desirable
principles in international commerce, the way in which they
were formulated was too vague and thus were likely to
generate uncertainty and non-uniformity in its
application. They also pointed out that since the draft
did not specify the consequences of failure to observe this
principle, remedial measures would be left to national
laws with the result that no uniformity of sanctions would
be achieved. The stronger opposition was from common law
delegates, who could not accept that good faith principle
would also cover the formation of contracts.
Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the
Work of Its Ninth Session, para. 70, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/142 (1977) .
reprinted in [1978] Y.B. U.N. Comm'n On Int'l Trade L. 61, 66, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 1/SER. A/1978.
See Gyula Eorsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 27 Am. J. Comp . L. 311,
314 (1979) .
Michael J. Bonell, Article 7, in Commentary on the International Sales Law;
The 198 Vienna Sales Convention 6 9 (Cesare M. Bianca and Michael J. Bonell
eds. , 1987)
.
17
Id.
18See E. Allan Farnsworth
,
Problems of the Unification of Sales Law
from the Standpoint of the Common Law Countries, in Problems of Unification
of International Sales Law 20 (1980) . In common law country, the principle
of good faith is confined to performance and enforcement of contracts,
not extended to formation of contracts. See discussion infra pp. 61-65.
One the other hand, representatives who favored
adopting the good faith principle asserted that the
insertion of the provision would be consistent with the
aims of the new international economic order and would
promote high standards of behavior in international trade
transactions. They argued that because of its universal
recognition there would be little harm in including in the
Convention the principle of good faith, which was of
necessity vague even in national laws.
In view of the sharp split of opinions, UNCITRAL
decided to refer the provision to a small working group to
draft a compromise. By relegating the relevance of good
faith to Article 7(1), a hard-won settlement was reached
between those "who would have preferred a provision
imposing directly on the parties the duty to act in good
faith, and those who on the contrary were opposed to any
explicit reference to the principle of good faith in the
Convention." ' This peculiar result has been described as a
"strange arrangement," ' "an awkward compromise", 24 and
ironically, "a statesmanlike compromise." 25
Eorsi, supra note 12, at 349
Id. (noting that "even the ' Treu und Glaubern' of the German BGB
remained vague for a long time until judicial practice eventually
defined its exact meaning.")
See Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastely' s Rhetorical
Analysis, 8 Nw . J. Int'll. & Bus. 623, 632(1988).
Bonell, supra note 16, at 83-84.
23Eorsi, supra note 12, at 354.
10
B. Good faith- -more than an interpretat ion principle
Through the resulting compromise in Article 7(1), good
2 6
faith principle gained a foothold in the Convention.
Taken literally, this compromise result does no more than
instruct courts interpreting the Convention's provisions
to consider "observance of good faith in international
trade" as one important factor. This treatment of the
good faith principle is in marked contrast to that in
national laws, where good faith is generally formulated as
a principle directly imposing an obligation of good faith
2 8
on contracting parties. The question that has to be
raised is what impact the Convention's principle of good
faith may have on the behavior of the contracting parties.
Commentators remain divided on this issue.
According to some commentators, Article 7(1) should be
read literally and good faith under the Convention is
Thomas E. Carbonneau & Marc S. Firestone, Transnational Law-Making
:
Assessing the Impact of the Vienna Convention and the Viability of
National Adjudication, 1 Emory J. Int'l Disp. Resol. 51, 74 (1986) .
Farnsworth, supra note 18 at 19.
Eorsi, supra note 12, at 348 (Professor Eorsi states that "it is
hoped that this meager result represents a modest start.")
27CISG art. 7(1) .
See supra note 4
.
29Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 23 Int'l
Law. 443, 467-468 (1989) (stating that almost everybody disagrees as to
the impact that the principle of good faith may have on the behavior
of the parties to international sales contracts)
.
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relevant solely as a tool of interpretation to which judges
must make recourse for avoiding the danger of reaching
inequitable results due to rigidly reading the Convention's
provisions. 30 Professor Farnsworth supports this view by
stating that Article 7(1) falls short of imposing a duty of
good faith on parties and whether the contracting parties
are subject to a good faith duty is to be settled by
national laws. 31 Professor Hillman also treats the
Convention' s good faith only as a supplement to the
interpretation of the Convention and is opposed of the view
that there exists an affirmative obligation requiring the
contracting parties to act in good faith. 3. Objecting to
using the Convention's good faith principle to deal with
the question of whether a party performs his obligations in
good faith, those commentators hold that courts can
directly apply a good faith standard set forth in national
law to measure the contracting parties' behavior. 3
30 See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales
Law, 24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp . L. 183, 210 (1994).
31Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT
Principles , Relevant International Conventions , and National Laws. 3
Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47, 55-56 (1995).
32Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contract
for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the
Legal Effect of "No Oral Modification" Clauses, 21 Cornell Int'l L.J.
449, 458 (1988); See also Winship, Formation of International Sales
Contracts Under the 1980 Convention, 17 Int'l Law. 10, 22 (1983)
(stating "good faith is relevant to interpretation of the Convention;
there is no general obligation that the parties carry out their
obligations in good faith.")
33See Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Conventions
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1984,
12
Conversely, some commentators support the view that
the good faith under the Convention also deals with the
behavior of the contracting parties. Professor Bonell
stated that good faith in Article 7(1) "necessarily
directed to the parties to each individual contract of
sale." 34 Professor Erosi also noted that the Convention's
good faith principle "may play an active role [policing the
contractual behavior] in spite of its location in the
Convention .
"
A close scrutiny of the status of good faith under
the Convention will reveal that the second view is
preferable. First, the impact of the inclusion of "good
faith" in Article 7(1) goes beyond its role as a mere
interpretation instrument. Where a judge employs this
instrument to interpret the Convention's provisions, the
parties' behavior might indeed be measured by a good faith
standard. To illustrate the impact of the interpretation
principle to the parties, one commentator gave the
following example of a case:
Under Article 24, a declaration of acceptance
"reaches" the addressee when "it is
delivered ... to his place of business or
1991 (1984) (stating "[i]n applying [article 7], national courts
remain free to draw on domestic . . . conceptions of good faith.") .
4Bonell, supra note 16, at 84.
Eorsi, General Provisions , in International Sales: The United Nations
Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods s 2 . 08 (N. Galston &
H. Smit eds. 1984) .
36Ferrari, supra note 23 at 215.
13
mailing address . . . " 3 If a party knows that
the other party who has a place of business is
away from his home [mailing address] for a
considerable period of time, and he nevertheless
sends the declaration to the mailing address, he
3 8
may violate the requirement of good faith.
In interpreting Article 24 under this circumstance, a
court might hold the declaration of acceptance should be
sent to the place of business rather than the mailing
address considering "observance of good faith in
international trade." Such interpretation would actually
require the accepting party to act in good faith sending
the declaration to a proper place where the addressee can
receive the declaration duly.
Furthermore, good faith has been embodied in the
Convention as a pervasive norm analogous to the good faith
obligation in national laws. Although in absence of an
explicit requirement for the parties to act in good faith,
an obligation of good faith imposed on the parties might be
established through the Convention's gap-filling provision
Article 7(2), which provides that:
37CISG art. 24
Erosi, supra note 34 at s 2.03
3 9
Id. Erosi sees no distinction between interpreting the Convention and
Interpreting the contract. In his opinion, " interpretation of the two
cannot be separated since the Convention is necessarily interpreted
by the parties also; after all, the Convention constitutes the law of
the parties insofar as they do not make use of Article 6 on freedom
of contract." Id.
4 Isaak I. Dore and James E. Defranco, A Comparison of the Non-
Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International
Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 Harv. Int'l L. J. 49,
61 (1982) .
14
[q]uestions concerning matters governed by the
Convention which are not expressly settled in
it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in
the absence of such principle, in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
41private international law.
Since the Convention fails to expressly address the
question whether the parties are subject to an obligation
of good faith, we should first resort to the Convention's
general principles according to the interpretative
guideline of Article 7(2).
Good faith has been considered as one of the general
principles laid down by the Convention. Even though there
is only one express reference to the good faith term in
Article 7(1), the relevance of the good faith principle is
not limited to the interpretation of the Convention. The
41CISG art. 7 (2) .
Id. Recourse to general principles in filling the gaps reflects a
method well-established in civil law codes. The term general principle
sounds alien to common lawyers. The common law notion of general
principles is different from the civil law's in that in civil law the
source from which the general principles are derived is the
legislation, whereas in common law, the source is basically the case
law. See Ferrari, supra note 29 at 220-221. However, the original
civil law approach of general principles has already gained acceptance
in some common law statutes. The good faith principle under the U.C.C.
is a typical example. Indeed, good faith has been established as a
basic principle running throughout the U.C.C. (U.C.C. 1-203. Comment),
and as "the foundation upon which the Code was drafted." Servbest
Foods, Inc. v. Emmessee Industries, Inc., 82 Ill.App 3d 662, 674, 403
N.E. 2d 1, 11(1980) (citing R. Anderson, Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code s
1-203 : 1 (1981) )
.
43 See e.g., Bernard Audit, La vente Internationale de marchandises 51 (1990)
(stating that good faith is one of the general principles, even though
it must be considered a mere instrument of interpretation) ; Schlechtriem,
supra note 12 (stating good faith is "one of the general principles
that must be regarded in interpreting and extending the uniform law")
.
15
Secretariat Commentary declares that the principle of good
faith "applies to all aspects of the interpretation and
application of the provisions of this Convention."
Furthermore, the Commentary points out that the principle
of good faith has been embodied in numerous substantive
provisions of the Convention dealing with the conduct of
the parties such as the non-revocability of certain offers,
the seller's right to remedy non-conforming goods, and the
parties' obligations to take steps to preserve the goods.
Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods Approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law Together with a Commentary Prepared by the Secretariat , U.N. Doc.
A/CONF./97/5 at 44, para . 2 (1979) [ hereinafter Commentary].
See id. A list of applications of the good faith principle in
particular provisions of the Convention has been provided in the
Commentary, where it is stated that " [a] mong the manifestations of the
requirement of the observance of good faith are the rules contained in
the following articles:
- article 14(2) (b) [which became final art. 16(2) (b) ] on
the non-revocability of an offer where it was reasonable
for the offeree to rely upon the offer being held open and
the offeree acted in reliance on the offer;
- article 19(2) [which became final art. 21(2)] on the
status of a late acceptance which was sent in such
circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it
would have reached the offeror in due time;
- article 27(2) [which became final art. 29(2)] in relation
to the preclusion of a party from relying on a provision
in a contract that modification or abrogation of the
contract must be in writing;
- article 35 and 44 [which became final articles 37 and 48]
on the rights of a seller to remedy non-conformities in
the goods
;
- articles 38 [which became final art. 40] which precludes
the seller from relying on the fact that notice of non-
conformity has not been given by the buyer in accordance
with articles 36 and 37 [which became final articles 38
and 39] if the lack of conformity relates to facts of
which the seller knew or could not have been unaware and
which he did not disclose to the buyer;
16
Thus, based on this general principle, the contracting
parties are subject to an obligation of good faith
throughout their contractual dealings including the
formation, performance and enforcement of the contract.
The most recent development of good faith principle at
the international level— in UNIDROIT Principles—renders
further support to the second view that gives good faith a
broader interpretation under the Convention. 46 UNIDROIT
Principles, which are viewed as "a component part of the
^general principles' underlying the Convention," may play a
gap-filling role in the interpretation or supplementation
of the Convention through the Article 7(2) gap-filling rule
of the Convention. 47 Resorting to the UNIDROIT Principles
rather than to national laws is considered to be a
preferable means to deal with unsettled problems under the
Convention, because it promotes the uniform application and
interpretation of the Convention by precluding an easy
resort to national laws and keeping the settlement of the
dispute within its international legal habitat. 48 In
articles 45(2), 60(2) and 67 [which became final
articles 49(2), 64(2) and 82] on the loss of the right to
declare the contract avoided;
-articles 74 and 77 [which became final articles 85 and
88] which impose on the parties obligations to take steps
to preserve the goods."
46UNIDROIT Principles, see infra note 257.
47Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles
in International Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay between the
Principles and the CISG, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 11149, 1156 (1995).
™Id. at 1153.
17
contrast to the Convention's ambiguous formulation of good
faith, UNIDROIT Principles explicitly establish good faith
as a principle governing the parties' contractual
dealings. 49 With recourse to UNIDROIT Principles through
the Article 7(2) of the Convention, an obligation of good
faith would be imposed on the contracting parties to
international sales contracts.
Considering the interpretation provision Article 7 as
a whole, we can find the first view questionable, which
rejects good faith as a general requirement under the
Convention. First, Article 7(1) requires interpreting
courts to consider the Convention's "international
character" and the "need to promote uniformity." If good
faith is not recognized as a general principle of the
Convention, courts will arguably be free to apply their own
national laws in defining good faith. Allowing courts to
apply national laws will inevitably lead to differing
interpretations with regard to the good faith requirement
because of the great diversity among jurisdictions. This
result would conflict with the Convention's goal
contemplated in Article 7 (1), i.e., the promotion of the
Convention's uniform application. 51 Secondly, Article 7(2)
requires courts ruling on questions that the Convention
See infra note 263
50CISG art. 7(1]
51See Honnold, supra note 9
18
does not expressly address to decide such questions in
accordance with the general principles on which the
Convention is based. 52 Only when a general principle can
not be ascertained, the dispute is to be resolved by
national law to which the rules of private international
law lead. 53 The first view ignores the fact that good faith
duty has been incorporated in the Convention's numerous
provisions and it is thereby qualified as a general
principle of the Convention. Leaving the issue of good
faith to be determined by national law without first making
recourse to such general principle disobeys the directive
of Article 7 (2)
.
Moreover, the legislative history and intent do not
give support to the first view. Although placing the term
good faith in the interpretation provision, the drafters
did not deny that the good faith principle might be
52CISG art. 7 (2) .
b3 Id. It should be noted that using a general principle to deal with
unsettled questions is limited by the application scope of the
Convention. The Convention does not apply to some sales and certain
aspects of a sale otherwise covered in national sales law. For
example, Article 5 states the Convention "does not apply to the
liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the
goods to any person." But under Article 2 of the U.C.C., claims for
personal injury may be based on a breach of warranty according to s 2-
606. See The American Law Institute, The Discussion Draft Of Uniform Commercial
Code Revised Article 2. Sales 10-11 (April 14, 1997) (stating since the
Convention does not address the issue of contractual privity, non-
privity actions are permitted under local U.S. law). Thus, when the
Convention expressly excludes its application to some sales or certain
aspects of a sale (See also Article 2 and Article 4), courts can not
resolve those issues by using a general principle on which the
Convention is based.
19
relevant to the behavior of contracting parties. Since
UNCITRAL is a political organization whose members
represent national governments, the compromise result in
Article 7(1) reflected a political settlement rather than
the direct interest of international commerce. ' Most of
the Convention's drafters recognized that good faith was a
highly desirable principle in international trade despite
its unusual formulation in Article 7 (1) . ' This belief is
evidenced by their embodying the requirement of good faith
into numerous provisions concerning the parties' rights and
obligations to the contract.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be found
that the principle of good faith under the Convention does
not only constitute an interpretation instrument, but also
concerns with the parties' behavior. An obligation of good
faith should be established by the general principle of
good faith that underlies the Convention's specific
provisions
.
C. An undefined concept and the vagueness problem
The Convention does not contain a definition for the
concept of good faith. Since the term good faith is only
See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
Carbonneau & Firestone, supra note 24, at 73.
5 Schlechtriem supra note 10 at 39 (stating "even those [drafters] who
had previously opposed [proposals with regard to good faith principle]
indicated again and again that it would be desirable to observe the
good faith principle.")
20
referred once in the interpretation provision, we can get
little help from the statutory language and context to
discern the meaning of the concept. In the legislative
history, there was rare discussion referring to defining
this concept, except asserting the vagueness of this
concept as an argument to reject the inclusion of good
faith principle as a whole. In absence of a definition of
the good faith, the standard of good faith behavior and
the scope of good faith obligation remain ambiguous. So
although good faith has been established as a principle
concerned with the parties' behavior, it provides no
guidance for judges to apply this principle to govern the
parties' contractual dealings. Furthermore, the inherent
vague nature of the good faith concept adds more difficulty
to its application.
Nobody denies that good faith is a vague concept.
There are wide differences of view over the meaning of this
concept. This is true even as far as domestic law is
concerned. ' Good faith is vague because the parties may
disagree on the components of good faith conduct. 5: ' A party
who conducts his activities in a manner consistent with his
See supra text accompanying note 16
.
5 Farnsworth, supra note 31, at 59. (states that there are three
different definitions of good faith applied by American courts, i.e.,
Justice Scalia's "implying terms" definition, Summers' "excluder"
definition, and Burton's "foregone opportunity" definition.)
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith,
1981 Duke L.J. 619, 643 (1981)
.
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own concept of good faith may discover that his standard of
good faith conduct differs greatly from that of the
opposite party or of a third party who sits in judgment of
the dispute. ' Although the principle of good faith has
been generally accepted, there is no uniformly recognized
definition that gives good faith a general meaning, even in
a single legal system. As one scholar describes, good
faith is a "concept which means different things to
different people in different moods at different times and
in different places."
Because of the vagueness of the concept, a judge often
wrestles with deciding whether a party's conduct complies
with the requirement of good faith. Domestic judicial
experience provides us with more pictures with regard to
this vague concept. The following two American cases
illustrate that the possibility of variations in the
requirements of good faith exits in similar or even a
single situation.
The first case ATotfc Equity Elevator v. Svihovec 63 (the
wheat case) involved the sale of wheat from the defendant
60 id.
In Civil Law countries, good faith takes the form of a blank concept
and remains undefined. See discussion infra pp. 27-28; In common law
countries, like America, there has been controvercy as to defining
good faith concept. See infra text accompanying notes 166-170.
62Michael G. Bridge, Does Angelo- Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine
of Good Faith ?, 9 Canadian Bus. L.J. 385, 407(1984).
63 236 N.W. 2d 900 (N.D. 1975) .
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seller to plaintiff buyer. The seller informed the buyer he
would deliver the wheat pursuant to the contract term
"March Delivery", but the buyer refused to accept the wheat
during that month and for two months thereafter because of
a shortage of boxcars. In earlier June the seller resold
his wheat at a slightly higher market price without
notifying the buyer. In September when market prices
fortuitously had doubled from the contract price, the buyer
required the seller to make delivery of the wheat under the
contract. Here, the court rejected the buyer's argument
that the seller was not entitled to resell his wheat
without giving reasonable notice of intent to resell, and
held that the seller had not acted in bad faith when he
resold his wheat after the buyer refused to accept
delivery. ' In this case, while the court imposed on the
buyer an affirmative duty of incurring costs of additional
storage space to provide reasonable facilities for the
receipt of the wheat, the seller was not obligated by any
duty of good faith to undertake that relatively effortless
notification task.
In the second case Baker v. Ratzlaff
(
the Popcorn
case)
,
the plaintiff buyer entered into a contract with
the defendant seller, which authorized the seller to
64 id. at 909.
6S id.
6G 564 P. 2d 153 (1977)
terminate the contract upon failure of the buyer to make
payment upon the deliveries. Payment was to be made after
each of the three separate deliveries. The buyer accepted
first two truckloads of the seller's popcorn at his plant
but made no payment at the time of delivery. The buyer
testified that the practice was that copies of weight
tickets were sent to his office where checks were written
and mailed. Approximately one week after the first two
deliveries, the seller sent a written notice of termination
claiming that the buyer had breached the contract . Within a
few days after receipt of the termination notice, the buyer
paid for both deliveries in full. However, the seller had
already entered into a contract with a third party for the
sale of the balance of his popcorn at a much higher price
.
The court held that the seller breached his duty of good
faith by declaring a termination of the contract upon a
"technical pretense", because of his failure to demand
payment at the time of delivery and in the subsequent
telephone conversations with the buyer, and his hasty
resale of the popcorn to another buyer at a price nearly
double the contract price.
In the popcorn case, the seller was held breach of the
duty of good faith although he first notified the buyer of
the termination according to the contract and then resold
the goods. While in the wheat case, the seller was not
67 id. at 157.
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found absence of good faith even though he did not give any
notice to the seller or terminate the contract before he
resold the goods. Moreover, the wheat case court reasoned
that the seller did not breach the duty of good faith
because no evidence showed his taking advantage of a rising
market to resell the goods. ' It seems that had the seller
been motivated by the ability to profit form resale of his
goods in such circumstance, the decision might have been
different
.
From the above two domestic cases, we can see how the
components of good faith requirement vary with context,
even with regard to the same single duty to give resale
notification. Since the concept of good faith does not
provide a definite standard to measure the parties' good
faith conducts, judges may apply the principle of good
faith on a case-by-case basis and give good faith specific
meanings in specific circumstances. Thus, critics argue
that this vague concept grants judges too much discretion
to assure predictability and certainty and that parties are
not able to avoid violations of the good faith requirement
with consistency. " Nevertheless, the problems with the
™ Svihovec , 236 N.W.2d at 909
"Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 215
(1968) (Summers stated that good faith is "an usually 'circumstance-
bound ' doctrine . "
)
See, Gillette, supra note 59, at 621; Diederichsen infra note 104 at
277.
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vague concept of good faith have not prevented the
principle of good faith from developing in national laws.
It is true that the concept of good faith remained vague
for long time since its inclusion, but later judicial
practice defined its meaning and developed specific rules
72
and general standards for its application. Domestic
experience also demonstrates that the good faith obligation
can be enforced with sufficient consistency regardless of
the vagueness of its connotation.
In the Convention context, however, the task of giving
meaning to good faith is even more difficult than in
domestic law because of differing notions of good faith in
various legal systems and the lack of case law as an aid to
discern the vague concept in specific cases. The undefined
status of "good faith" as well as the inherently vague
nature of this concept may create problems for courts in
deciding when and how to apply the good faith principle. 74
On the one hand, a court may ignore this principle
altogether because of its vague formulation. On the other
hand, a court may abuse this principle by freely attaching
Dore & Defranco supra note 40, at 61-62.
See discussion infra pp. 29-32.
See Gillette, supra note 59, at 646. (noting "German experience
suggests the possibility that an imprecise standard of good faith can
have independent status and still be enforced with sufficient
consistency to avoid the administrative difficulties [of identifying
the good faith conduct] addressed above.")
.
Dore & Defranco, supra note 40, at 61.
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the concept a notion so as to reach a result which the
75
court happens to consider fair in the situation. In
either case the role of good faith principle and its
uniform application will be destroyed.
To solve such problems, it is desirable to promote a
uniform understanding of the Convention's good faith
concept and the scope of good faith obligation. For this
task, We shall first examine the principle of good faith in
national laws and another international source -- UNIDROIT
Principles. The following comparative study may provide us
with possible common bases for the analysis of the
Convention's good faith principle.
15
id.
III. GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE IN CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
A. General
In civil law countries, which generally have more
experience with the principle of good faith than common law
countries, references to "good faith" appear in various
codes in both specific provisions and in "general
clauses". 71 ' All of those code provisions and "general
clauses" formulate the concept of good faith loosely. The
legislators did not give a general definition of good
faith. The following description of the German Civil Code's
As to reference to good faith in "general clause", the well-known
example is Swiss Civil Code which incorporates the principle of good
faith in Article 2 of its Preliminary Chapter stating "[e]very person
is bound to exercise his rights and fulfill his obligations according
to the principles of good faith." This article as a "general clause"
governs the whole field of rights and obligations in Swiss Civil Code.
In other civil codes, such as German Civil Code and French Civil Code,
good faith appears in some specific provisions governing a particular
subject-matter, but those specific provisions may evolve into a
general principle throughout all a civil code. To give an example of
the German Civil Code, its section 242 states "[t]he debtor is bound
to effect performance according to the requirements of good faith,
giving consideration to common usage." This article seems to concern
only the obligation of debtor. "It was, however, clear from the
beginning that the precept of acting in accordance with accepted legal
custom and giving consideration to the justified interests of the
other party, does not apply to the debtor alone but has to be valid
for the creditor" ( Newman, supra note 1, at 278) . As to its further
sweeping extensions, Professor Dawson writes "the requirements of good
faith have transformed the law of contracts and have penetrated deeply
throughout the whole German private law. "(John P. Dawson,
Unconscionable Coercion: the German Version, 89 Har. L. Lev. 1041, 1045
(1976) ) .
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approach to good faith concept is applicable to most civil
law codifications generally:
[U] tilizing the general concepts developed by
civil-law theory, [the makers of the German Civil
Code] sought to lay down abstractly formulated
rules, couched in terms of rigidly defined
concepts and comprising as many individual
solution as possible . . . Still, they had
sufficient insight into the variety and
variability of life-situations to insert in the
Code a number of blanket concepts . . . such as
'good faith' {Treu und Glauben) , 'good
morals' (gute Sitten) , 'fairness' (Billigkeit) , and
the like, which left some lee-way for judicial
law- finding.
The blanket concept of good faith opened up a wide
discretion for judges to deal with changing circumstances.
Judicial interpretation of this blanket concept produced a
mass of case law, which contributed much to the development
of good faith principle in the codified civil law. ' In
major civil law countries, good faith has evolved into a
principle of the greatest importance for the entire field
of private law by the process of interpretation by courts
and legal writers. A brief review of such process with
regard to the good faith provision of one important civil
J. F. O'Connor, Good Faith in English Law 85 (Dartmouth, 1990) (Quoting
Rumelin, Erlebte Wandlungen in Wissenschaft und Lehre, translated in
Jurisprudence of Interests: Selected Writings 17-18, (M. Magdalena Schoch
ed. , 1948)
.
78
See, John P. Dawson, Germany' s Case-Law Revolution, in The Oracles of the
Law 461-479 (1968) .
790' Connor supra note 77, at 85.
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code may provide us with some ideas of this blanket concept
in civil law system.
B. The development of good faith principle in German law
The most famous legislative formulation of good faith
principle is that found in section 242 of German Civil
Code. 8 ' It states "[t]he debtor is bound to effect
performance according to the requirements of good faith,
giving consideration to common usage." This seemingly
innocent provision received a reluctant response by the
judiciary at the beginning. During the first two decades
after 1900, article 242 was rarely used for any purpose.
The reluctance of the judiciary was eventually overborne by
the disastrous inflation after World War I. The hardship
and dislocation created by the rapid and catastrophic
decline in the value of German mark induced the courts to
intervene. ' To deal with the intolerable injustice, the
German Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht , finally employed
80
Burgerkiches Gesetzbuch [BGB] s 242, translated by I. Forrester, S. Goren
and H.M. Ilgen(1975)
.
S1 ld.
Dawson, supra note 78, at 465. (referring to J.W. Hedemann, Die Fluct in
die Generalklausen 9-10 (Tubingen, 1933)) .
The inflation began during the war and finally in November 1923 the
mark plummeted to less than a trillionth of its value. As to
application of article 242 to the problems created by the inflation,
see generally, Nussbaum, Money in the Law 199-204, 206-215 (2nd ed.1950);
Dawson, Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany 1914-1924,
33 Mich. L. R. 171 (1934) .
4
Dawson, supra note 78, at 465.
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the article 242 and concluded that the contractual
obligation to effect performance according to the
requirement of good faith could not be fulfilled by
8 5
tendering payment with worthless currency. The German
courts "revalorized" the various money debts for
contractual parties, converting them into stable money
values, by individualized means considered to be just and
8 6
equitable according to the specific circumstances.
Good faith principle derived from BGB 242 was the
stated legal basis for the decisions of thousands of the
revalorization cases. However, in applying such principle
to those cases, the courts did not develop a corpus of
definite standards by which the contractual performance
8 8
could be measured. In each case, the judge only
investigated particular circumstance of the case and then
exercised his discretion to arrive a decision which he
85100 R.G.Z. 129 (Sept. 21, 1920), translated by Von Mehren & J.Gordley,
The Civil Law System 733 (2nd ed.1977) . This breakthrough case involving
a long-term lease in which the lessor had promised to supply steam
heat; the increased cost of coal and labor had produced a net loss for
the lessor almost ten times the annual rent. The court stated that the
conditions created by the unexpected outcome of the war and the
unexpected overturning of all economic relations required the judge to
interfere with existing contractual relation, and the price term for
the steam heat supplied should be revised according to the requirement
of good faith and fairness. Id.
E.J. Cohn, Manual of German Law 6 (2nd ed.1968) . By converting the
contract price into current money, the judge actually rewrote contract
terms for parties under the requirement of good faith. See infra
discussion accompanying note 124
.
870' connor, supra note 77 at 87.
**Id.
31
conceived to be consistent with the "sense of fairness,
justice, and 'conscience' of the German people." ' At this
stage, the concept of good faith remained vague and
amorphous in the mind of German judges, even no more clear
than their feeling of equity. Good faith was only an
instrument or slogan employed by them to deal with the
dramatically changed and unforeseen circumstances.
This situation gave rise to much confusion and
criticism. 9 ' Concerned about "judicial security", German
legal scholars started a "campaign" to impose order on
judge-made chaos. They classified conglomerate mass of
solutions attributed by courts to article 242, and
extracted specific rules from those solutions that could
be gathered in clusters or "types" . ' Treating those
specific rules as though they had been detached from their
source in Article 242, German courts came to apply good
faith in the form of specific rules. Those rules provided
8S id.
Cohn, supra note 86, at 206. It was criticized that the courts, in
dealing with those revaluation cases based on the good faith
provision, were in danger of becoming institutions to distribute the
goods of life in accordance with ethical points of view.
91
Dawson, supra note 78, at 496.
Id. For example, the specific rule "might relate to a course of
conduct (e.g. pre- judicial delay in asserting a claim, assertion of
fact or intention on which others had relied) or some identifiable
disruption in a legal relation (e.g. failure to co-operate or changed
conditions in contract)
.
Id.
93
Id. as to those specific rules developed by German courts and legal
scholars, see supra discussion with regard to the scope of good faith
obligation at pp. 35-41.
courts with more clear guidance, and at the same time
placed some limitation on their discretion in applying good
faith principle to specific case. Thus although the BGB
contains no general definition of "good faith" , the concept
of good faith could be more clearly perceived from those
specific rules and their applications than from the mass of
• 94
revaluation cases.
C. Good faith- -an objective concept in civil law system
In BGB 242, the fact that the good faith term is
coupled with "common usage" suggests that good faith should
be understood as an objective concept. As Professor Powell
pointed out, the success of the German principle of good
faith has been largely due to the fact that it consisted,
in essence, in appeal to common usage. ' German judges
measure contractual performance by a standard of good faith
"according to common usage" , rather than according to
parties' subjective intentions or judges' subjective and
96
abstract higher order of values. Even in revalorization
40' connor, supra note 77, at 8!
R. Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, in Legal 9 Current Problems 37
(1956) .
O'Connor, supra note 77 at 89. Professor O'Connor comments that any
departure from the standard of good faith "according to common usage"
to one according to a (subjective) vague and abstract higher order of
values brings with it a new risk of German good faith chaos greater
than that presented earlier by the revalorization cases. It is worth
noting that some German legal scholars in recent years proposed using
a subjective good faith standard to excuse non-performance of a
contract when performance conflicts in some way with the conscience or
"finer feelings" of a party. According to this proposal, for instance,
cases where German courts invoked those "high-level moral
and social ideals that hover about the formal valid legal
norms," the decisions rendered were based on an objective
test a realistic assessment of the particular
circumstance according to commonly held view on justice and
fairness
.
In other civil law countries, the concept of good
faith has also been elaborated in a way that effects the
common usage or commercial standards rather than subjective
judicial whim. In France, good faith is considered as an
9 8
objective concept in the contractual context. French
courts use Article 1134 of French Civil Code to deal with
unfair or dishonest conduct in performance of the
contract. The cases offered by one leading textbook as
examples of moral judgments on the honest conduct of a
party are also cases where the decisions might be justified
a famous singer who at the last moment refuses to honor her engagement
because she feels she must not leave the bedside of her gravely ill
child, or the atomic scientist who breaks his contract of employment
because of conscientious scruples. This proposed use of good faith as
a subjective test is considered clearly problematic. ( Rudolf B.
Schlesinger, Comparative Law 526-527 (3rd ed.1970) .
91
Id.
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Id. at 95. (referring to Professor Vouin's conclusion that good faith
in contractual contexts is an objective concept, determining in an
abstract manner the rights and obligations of the parties. (R. Vouin, La
Bonne Foi 454 (Bordeaux, 1939) )
Article 1134, para . 3 , of French Civil Code states: "Agreement
lawfully formed take the place of law for those who have made them.
They cannot be revoked except by mutual consent or on grounds allowed
by law. They must be performed in good faith." (the translation is that
given in Von Mehren-Gordley, The Civil Law system (2nd ed. 1977) ) .
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on the objective basis of commercial usage. That is to
say that good faith does not rest in the subjective
discretion of judges, but is grounded in commercial
standards
.
The most recent legislative treatment to good faith
concept in civil law warrants attention. The new Dutch
Civil Code differentiates good faith in the sense of
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing from good faith in the sense of honesty in fact.
To prevent any possible confusion, the Dutch legislature
uses the term good faith only in the latter sense, and
describes the term in the former sense by the concept of
"reasonableness and equity". 1 ' However, the Dutch
legislature has adopted an objective test in using both
senses of this concept, as Professor Hartkamp pointed out
that :
In Contract law, acting in good faith refers to
the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing, or as the Dutch legislature has
put it, acting in accordance with reasonableness
and equity. This is a purely objective test . . .
In the other sense, good faith refers to a test
that originally was purely subjective, indicating
a state of mind (lack of notice) such as a
requirement for the acquisitions of movable
property where the transferor is not the owner of
O'Connor, supra note 77 at 95 (referring to the French textbook:
Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratigue de Droit Civil Francais 99 (2nd ed.1952)) .
Arthur S. Hartkamp, Judicial Discretion Under the New Civil Code of
the Netherlands, 40 Am. J. Comp . L. 551,554 (1992).
102
Id. at 554-55
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the thing. Later on, this test was developed in
such a way as to include also an important
objective element. In the new Dutch Code, this
results from article 3:11, where it is stated
that good faith in this sense not only requires
that the party concerned did not know the
relevant state of affairs, but also that he
should not have known it; this implies that he
may be under a duty to investigate.
Thus, the concept of good faith in Dutch Civil Code,
irrespective of whether it is used in objective or
subjective sense, demands that the good faith conduct
should not be determined just based on the subjective mind
of contracting parties or unchecked discretion of judges,
but by the objective standards of commercial
reasonableness
.
D. The scope of good faith obligation
The blanket concept of good faith itself does not
present clear and certain contour for the good faith
obligation that may be imposed on parties. In order to
determine the scope of good faith obligation, it is
necessary to examine the function that good faith principle
performs in civil codes. The following discussion is to be
mainly focused on the good faith principle under German
Civil Code, which basically reflects the generality of
civil law on this issue.
The principle of good faith derived from BGB 242
performs three functions in its application, which includes
Id. at 554
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extension and creation of rights and duties, limitation on
the exercise of rights, and transformation and relief of
contractual obligations because of changed or unforeseen
circumstances. 104 Those functions affect the extent that
courts impose good faith obligations on the parties.
The first function of this principle- -extension and
creation of rights and duties- -expands the obligation by-
creating additional duties for parties which have neither
been expressly provided in the contract or in statutory
law. 10 " The range of those additional duties is expansive.
It does not only include those duties that serve to insure
the proper execution of the contract and preserve parties'
contractual expectations, but also extends to those duties
existing before the actual conclusion of a contract, or
Uwe Diederichsen Principles of Equity in German Civil Law, in Equity
in the World's Legal Systems 279-296 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973) .
105
Jd. at 279.
On contrast with common law (see discussion infra pp. 61-65, civil law
countries generally extend the obligation of good faith to the
formation stage of contract. German law imposes parties in negotiation
a contractual obligation based on the doctrine of culpa in
con trahendo (fault in contractual negotiation) . According to this
doctrine, a party who commits a breach of the obligation is liable for
contractual damages (reliance damages) . For discussion of the doctrine
of culpa in contrahendo, see generally A. von Mehren & J. Gordley, supra
note 85 at 837-40 . In France, precontractual liability is imposed
not for breach of contractual obligation, but on tort principles; the
duty of good faith at negotiation stage is based on a theory of
tortuous misrepresentation, which demands that when one makes
misrepresentations that cause damage to another, he is obligated to
remedy the harm. See generally Ralph B. Lake, Letters of Intent: A
Comparative Examination Under English, U.S., French, and West German
Law, 18 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l. & Econ. 331, 350-351(1984). Some other civil
law countries even explicitly impose the good faith duty in the
formation of contract. For example, s 1337 of Italian Civil Code
requires the parties to act in good faith "in the conduct of
37
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even after all contractual duties have been performed
Two examples given by Professor Diederichsen are
illustrative for those extended additional duties. The
first example concerns the duty to provide relevant
information to the other party in the negotiation of a
contract: the seller of a used car which had suffered
substantial damage in an accident, may be obliged to
inform the buyer of this fact prior to the signing of the
10 8
contract according to the good faith principle. The
second example is that after the termination of a tenancy,
the landlord may have a good faith duty to forward to his
former tenant the incoming mail. ' Those various additional
duties derived from BGB 242 are treated very much like
independent obligations by German courts, so that a party
even can claim independent remedies, such as specific
performance of giving relevant information, for violation
of those duties. ' Thus with this function, the scope of
good faith obligation extends outside the contractual
context and the parties may be subject to a good faith
obligation which is independent from their contract.
negotiations and the formation of the contract" ; The Israeli Contracts
(General Part) Law, 5733 - 1973 s 12 provides that in "negotiating a
contract, a person shall act in customary manner and in good faith."
101
Id. at 279-280.
108
Xd. at 280.
109
Id.
Id. at 281.
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The second function, limitation on the exercise of
right, has a restrictive effect on parties' contractual or
even statutory rights. Under the principle of good faith,
the exercise of those rights has to be confined to the
limits dictated by good faith. ' Any exercise of a right
which offends the precept of good faith renders the right
void. ' To decide whether the exercise of a right violates
the requirement of good faith, German courts and legal
scholars have developed a number of specific rules. For
example, a party may not exercise his contractual right in
a way which may destroy reasonable expectations of the
other party for the contract. ' A party is also prevented
from abusing his right by citing statutory form
requirements, where he knew about a form requirement and
caused the other party, who was ignorant of such
requirement, to conclude the contract which is not in
compliance with the form. ' A more strict limitation of
right is that a party who has unreasonably delayed in
claiming his right may be deprived of such right even
though the statutory period of limitation has not
expired. These rules reveal that good faith requirement
X11 id.
ll2 id.
113 id.
114
Jd. at 282
115
Jd. at 287
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may in some circumstances override express contract terms
that provide for the rights of the parties, and even can
modify the direct effect of a statutory rule. So the scope
of good faith obligation is further expanded by this
restrictive function.
The third function of good faith principle, as
applied by German judges in revolaration cases, is to
adjust or cancel contracts the performance of which has
become an unreasonable burden for one of the parties
because of unforeseen or changed circumstances. ' This
function is usually referred to as the doctrine of absence
or lapse of the contractual basis. The basic idea of this
doctrine is that where the basis for a contract has
disappeared, the contract must be modified or canceled. ' A
generally accepted definition for the contractual basis was
proposed by Professor Paul Oertman in 1921 which reads as
follows
:
"Contractual basis" is an assumption made by one
party that has become obvious to the other during
the process of formation of the contract and has
received his acquiescence, provided that the
assumption refers to the existence, or the coming
into existence, of circumstances forming the very
basis of the contractual intention.
Alternatively, "contractual basis is the common
116
Id. at 283.
i:L1
Id. at 290
lie
Id.
19
Dawson, supra note 78, at 468.
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assumption on the part of the respective parties
j= t- • 12 °of such circumstances.
A question with this doctrine is how great the change of
these circumstances has to be in order to trigger the
application of this doctrine. German courts ruled out some
requirements for the application: the doctrine of absence
or lapse of the contractual basis is applied only if "the
consequences of strict enforcement of the contract would,
considering the changed circumstances, cause entirely
unreasonable demands on the debtor" or in other words
"if the further upholding of the original terms of the
contract would lead to unbearable consequences indefensible
with regard to law and justice."
It has been asserted that the language "entirely
unreasonable demands" or "unbearable consequences
indefensible with regard to law and justice" is so vague
that the decision to large extent depends on judges'
discretion. There is no doubt that this doctrine provides
courts with considerable flexibility to handle the problem
of changed or unforeseen circumstances. The consequence
of applying this doctrine enables the courts to "rewrite
contract terms for parties in such a way that it represents
arrangements which upright parties would reasonably have
Diederichsen supra note 104, at 2 90 (quoting Paul Oertmann, Die
Geschaftsgrundlage 3 7 (Leipzig, 1921) ) .
121
Id. at 291. (Citing O GHZ 1, 62 (68); BGH MDR 1953, 282 ).
122
Id. (Citing BGH NJW 195, 2203 f . )
12i
Id. at 293.
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made if they had considered the future prevailing situation
at the time of concluding the contract." 124 Thus by the
third function of good faith principle, the scope of good
faith obligation has been expanded to the extent that a
judge can adjust or even impose obligations to parties
considering the changed circumstance.
With the three functions which largely broaden the
scope of good faith obligation, it is not surprising that
the principle of good faith was described as an "overriding
126
and super-eminent principles" under German Civil Code.
This general principle reflects the intention of the
legislator to let equity become positive in the Code and
empower judges to adapt the rigidity of the codified law to
changing circumstances and pursue equitable result with
flexibility. ' On the other hand, such extensive
interpretation and application of the principle of good
faith has been criticized as endangering the certainty and
predictability of the law.
l2i
Id. at 294.
Common law deals with the problem of changed or unforseen
circumstances by the doctrine of impracticability rather than the
general principle of good faith. In fact, the good faith principle in
civil law may not necessarily give courts more discretion than common
law courts have under the impracticability doctrine. See U.C.C. s 2-
615.
GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW --AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL
Study and Research 94 (2d ed. 194 9) .
Diederichsen supra note 104, at 277.
12B
Id. at 296.
IV. GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE IN COMMON LAW SYSTEM
A. Good faith under the U.C.C.
The United States has a relatively well -developed
principle of good faith. ' The national-wide recognition of
this principle in the United States was inspired by the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code's express
obligation of good faith. ' Section 1-203 of the U.C.C.
provides for the general obligation of good faith, which
states that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." " According to the Official Comment of the
U.C.C, Section 1-203 establishes good faith as a basic
principle running throughout the Code. ' This U.C.C.
Farnsworth supra note 31, at 63
Before adoption of the U.C.C, only a few courts, notably those of
New York and California, held that a general obligation of good faith
was implied in the contract. In kire La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong
Co. 263 N.Y.79, 188 N.E. 163(1933), the New York Court of Appeals
articulated the obligation of good faith as:
In every contract there is an implied covenant that
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in
every contract there exists an implied convenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
See also Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 277,
118 N.E. 618, 619 (1918); Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press
Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771,128 P. 2d 665, 677 (1942).
131U.C.C. s 1-203.
132U.C.C. s 1-203 Comment
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principle , with breadth comparable to civilian
counterparts, 13 ' specifies that "in commercial transactions
good faith is required in the performance and enforcement
of all agreements or duties."
Good faith is a key concept in the U.C.C. being
expressly mentioned in some fifty of the 400 sections.
The meaning of this concept varies with context. Unlike
civil codes, the U.C.C. defines the concept of good faith
in its provisions.
1. Article 1 definition
Section 1-201(19) contains a general definition of
good faith, which describes good faith as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." "Honest in
fact" characterizes good faith as a subjective concept.
Under this definition, as Professor Farnsworth explains,
good faith is used to describe a state of mind: innocent
ignorance or lack of suspicion. This meaning is very close
13 7to that of lack of notice. As a general definition, this
"it is said that the Chief Reporter for the Code, Karl Llewellyn,
"smuggled" the concept of good faith from German Civil Code. Fansworth
supra note 31, at 51-52.
134U.C.C. s 1-203 Comment
Farnsworth, Good faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 667 (1963)
.
136U.C.C. s 1-201 (19) .
Farnsworth, supra note 13 5, at 668.
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subjective concept of good faith is applicable to each
13 8
article of the Code unless otherwise specified.
It can be seen that the U.C.C.'s general definition
of good faith is narrower than the objective good faith
concept under civil codes. 13 ' To understand why the U.C.C
defines good faith in this narrow subjective sense, it is
useful to go back to the 1949 draft of the Code. In the
1949 draft of the Code, the drafters adopted a single
definition of good faith to be used throughout the Code
that differed significantly from the current section 1-
201(19) definition. 140 The 1949 definition did not only
require "honesty in fact", but also included an objective
element of observing "the reasonable commercial standards
of any business or trade" in which a party was engaged.
The objective standard, however, was removed after it
provoked controversy during the hearings of the New York
138U.C.C. s 1-201. The prefaced language of s 1-201 states clearly the
general applicability of the definitions provided under this section.
Currently, some more specific definitions of good faith have already
been added to some articles other than article 2 . See infra notes
177-181.
In civil codes there are also numerous references to good faith in
the sense of "honesty" or "ignorance of the true facts" , but the civil
law concept of good faith is not limited to this subjective standard,
but also generally includes an objective standard of commercial
reasonableness. See discussion supra part C in chapter III.
140U.C.C. s 1-201(18) (May 1949 Draft). This section reads:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned. Good faith includes good faith
toward all prior parties and observance by a person of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade
in which he is engaged.
lil
Id.
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Law Revision Commission. 142 The American Bar Association's
Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section agreed that
good faith should be equated with only "honesty". 14 This
action left the general definition in Article 1 requiring
only honesty in fact
.
2. Article 2 definition
Article 2 of the U.C.C., the Vienna Sales Convention's
American counterpart, applies to transactions in goods.
This article includes a specific definition of good faith
applying to merchants involved in a sale of goods. The
objective "reasonable commercial standards", which was
removed from Article 1 definition, survived in this
Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of Uniform Commercial Code,
58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 812 (1958) . New York bankers strongly objected
the objective standard because they concerned that an objective
standard of good faith, when applying to Article 3, would impose too
great a burden on financial institutions to inquire into the status of
negotiable instruments in order to qualify as holders in due course.
Id. This usage of the good faith concept in the sense of good faith
purchase is different from that discussed in this thesis, i.e., good
faith in the formation and performance of the contract.
Id. The ABA Section was concerned that an objective standard would
freeze commercial practices.
144U.C.C. s 2-102.
45U.C.C. s 2-103(1) (b) . This specific definition reads "
'
[g] ood faith'
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." A
merchant under U.C.C. is defined in s 2-104(1) as follows:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transactions or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill
.
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merchant definition. Here, good faith means not only
"honesty in fact" , but also "the observance of reasonable
standards of fair dealing in the trade." This definition
is partially consistent with Farnsworth's description of
good faith concept in the sense of good faith performance
:
"good faith" is not limited to the state of mind- -with
innocence, or lack of suspicion. Under Article 2 the
inquiry also goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness in
performance or enforcement of the contract
.
Good faith performance requires that the behavior of
the parties comply with an objective standard tied to
commercial reasonableness. ' As Farnsworth argues:
Good faith performance has always required the
cooperation of one party where it was necessary
in order that the other might secure the expected
benefits of the contract. And the standard for
determining what cooperation was required has
always been an objective standard, based on the
decency, fairness or reasonableness of the
community and not on the individual's own
beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or
reasonable. Both common sense and tradition
dictate an objective standard for good faith
c 150performance
.
146
Id.
Farnsworth, supra note 135, at 668
1AB
Id.
149
Jd. at 671.
Id. at 672. Professor Farnsworth also found support for the
objective standard from Roman law where 'good faith' was used in the
same sense as the good faith performance for commercial transactions,
including the sale. Id. at 669-670.
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In the sales context, the U.C.C. uses this objective
standard to protect parties' reasonable expectations.
This standard is most commonly employed where a contract
contains an open quantity or price term, * or is subject to
conditions within one party's control. " In these cases a
"honest in fact" subjective standard would not be
sufficient to govern one party' s discretion to set or
control terms as to quantity, price, or to control some
contractual conditions. Courts must look to commercial
reasonable standards to interpret the contract rather than
allow any demand or price to bind the other party.
sl
Id. good faith performance requires "cooperation on the part of one
party to the contract so that another party will not be deprived of
his reasonable expectations."
^Particular applications of this objective definition appear in some
provisions in Article 2. See e.g., s 2-306(1} on output and
requirements contracts provides " [a] term which measures the quantity
by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means
such actual output or requirement as may occur in good faith . . . "
;
s 2-305(2) on open price terms provides "[a] price to be fixed by the
seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith."
More generally, s 2-311(1) requires that any provision under a sales
contract leaving performance to be specified by one of the parties
must be made "in good faith and within the limits set by commercial
reasonableness .
"
A typical example for contracts subject to conditions in the control
of one party is the satisfaction contract, which is conditioned on
that a party be satisfied with the other party's performance. The
U.C.C. does not contain specific provisions dealing with this kind of
contracts. Nevertheless, common law cases suggest that the obligation
of good faith implied from conditions of one party's satisfaction be
governed by Article 2 good faith standard. See e.g., Neumiller Farms,
Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979) (engrafting the U.C.C. 's
definitions of good faith onto the good faith obligation established
by relying on common law precedents); City of Rochester v. Vanderlinde
Elec. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 185, 188, 392 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170(1977); Western
Hills, Or., Ltd. v. Pfau, 265 Or. 137, 508 P. 2d 201 (1973) (en banc).
154Farnsworth Supra note 135, at 671-672.
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The application of this objective standard of good
faith is well illustrated in Orange and Rockland Utilities
,
Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. ' In this case, the plaintiff
buyer (O&R) entered a five year contract with the defendant
seller (Hess) beginning from 1969 for the supply of its
requirements of fuel oil at a price of $2.14 per barrel.
The quantity clause of the contract included estimates of
the requirements for each year, based on expected
consumption by the plaintiff, and with the anticipation
that gas would be the primary fuel used by O&R for
power. As the market price for fuel oil rose rapidly to
$4.30 per barrel in 1970, O&R substantially increased its
use of fuel oil and reduced its use of gas. When Hess
refused to supply more than the estimated quantity, O&R
sued Hess for breach of contract and claimed damages based
on alleged requirements that were double the estimated
quantity. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim for
damage on the ground that its requirements for fuel oil
supply were not incurred in good faith. 160
155 59 A.D. 2d 110(1977)
156id. at ill
lsl ld.
sa
Id. at 112-113
lS9
Id. at 113.
160
Jd.
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In this case O&R did not represent its requirements
dishonestly because its requirement for fuel oil did
increase greatly at that time. But the court found that the
increase in requirements was due to the great increases in
sales of electricity to other utilities by O&R and its net
shift in fuels used for generation, from gas to oil. The
court inferred that by increasing its reliance on oil for
its own power needs, O&R was able to seize " the
opportunity to release its reserve commitment of gas" and
reap substantial profits; and by increasing its sales of
energy to other utilities, O&R in effect transformed its
requirements from those of a fuel oil consumer into those
162
of an energy seller. O&R's demand for such increased
requirements went beyond the Hess's reasonable expectation-
-estimates based on the plaintiff's own consumption of fuel
oil and the plaintiff's use of gas as the primary fuel for
power generation. ' The court finally concluded that the
O&R's use of the requirement contract "to suddenly and
dramatically propel itself into the position of a large
seller of power to other utilities evidences a lack of good
faith dealing". 164
161 ld. at 114
162 ld. at 117.
163
Id. at 120.
16
*Id. at 117.
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As to the requirement of "good faith" in this case,
the court relied on pre-Code case law and established a
reasonable commercial standard to measure the buyer's
requirement demand, i.e., a buyer in a rising market
cannot use a fixed price in a requirements contract for the
purpose of taking advantage of market conditions at the
seller's expense. "' Here it is obvious that a test merely
based on the party's subjective mind make no sense for
determining good faith performance of the contract . It is
the objective standard of good faith that justified the
court in protecting the party's reasonable commercial
expectations
.
3. Erosion of the subjective standard
Although an objective standard based on commercial
reasonableness is a highly desirable test for good faith
performance and enforcement of contract, the U.C.C. at the
beginning did not apply this objective standard
pervasively. Originally, only Article 2 had an objective
definition and good faith was limited to "honesty in fact"
outside Article 2.
The U.C.C. 's such formulation of good faith concept
met with vigorous criticism. Professor Farnsworth pointed
out that the good faith principle under the U.C.C. was much
"enfeebled" by the subjective definition in section 1-
203(19), and he argued that an objective standard, as
lss id. at 114.
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reflected in the U.C.C.'s reference to commercial
reasonableness, should be more generally adopted to
evaluate good faith. 1 ' Professor Summers also criticized
that this narrow definition failed to cover many forms of
nondishonest bad faith and thereby distorted the principle
of good faith under the Code. 1 In his influential 1968
article, Summers defined good faith using an "excluder"
analysis. According to this analysis, "good faith . . is
best understood as an 'excluder' - -it is a phrase which has
no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves
16 9
to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith."
Summers further pointed out that the concept of good faith
should be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition
in order to enable courts to deal with any and all forms of
contractual bad faith.
Both Farnsworth's and Summers' analysis found their
ways into the good faith provision of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. In the Restatement, good faith has
Farnsworth supra note 135, at 673-74.
Id. at 679. Professor Farnsworth indicated that "the Code's concepts
of good faith performance and commercial reasonableness await
development, even beyond the bounds of the Code, at the hands of
resourceful lawyers and creative judges." Id.
Summers, supra note 69, at 210-12.
169
Jd. at 196.
110
Id. at 215.
71Restatement (Second) of Contract (1981) [hereinafter Restatement] .
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been formulated as an open-ended concept. The standard of
good faith set forth in Section 205 of the Restatement
stands in marked contrast to the subjective standard of
good faith articulated in Section 1-201 (19)of the U.C.C..
Section 205 provides an objective standard that goes well
beyond the U.C.C.'s standard: "Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.' As the comments to
Section 205 explain, in the performance and enforcement of
contracts, good faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectation of the other party" and it requires contracting
parties' behavior to comply with "community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness." This objective
standard is generally applied by courts to measure a
175party's performance in cases arising outside the U.C.C.
The drafters of Restatement did not attempt to define the good faith
concept with a general meaning, but adopted a approach which is
actually based on Summers' 'excluder' analysis. The 'excluder'
analysis directly found its way into the commentary to the
Restatement ' s good faith provision, which explains that
A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible,
but the following types are among those which have been
recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of
the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to
cooperate in the other party's performance. (Restatement
(Second) of Contracts s 205 Comment d.)
173Restatement s 205 (1981) .
174
Id. Comment a.
See e.g., Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal . Rptr. 550
(Ct.App. 1990); Pizza Management, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F.Supp.
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The Restatement ' s conceptualization of good faith
demonstrates the general recognition of an objective
concept of good faith in American contract field.
The erosion of the subjective standard of good faith
has already happened under the U.C.C.. Over years of U.C.C.
revision more specific good faith definitions have been
added to Article 2A, Article 3, Article 4 , Article
5, and Article 8. Among those specific definitions,
only Article 5 (letter of credit) definition continues to
18 2
apply the subjective standard-- "honesty in fact". All
1154 (D.Kan. 1990); Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P. 2d 554
(Or. 1987); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d
1259 (10th Cir. 1988); American Warehousing & Distrib., Inc. v.
Michael Ede Management, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. Ct.App. 1987).
See generally Robert S. Summers The General Duty of Good Faith --
Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982) .
Professor Summers asserted that the formulation of good faith concept
in section 2 05 was "based on numerous judicial opinions imposing a
duty of good faith, several major statutory developments [including
U.C.C] and the published writings of professors of law", and thereby
"it enjoys full-fledged Restatement legitimacy."
77
U.C.C. s 2A-103(2). Article 2A applies the good faith definition
same as in Article 2 (s 2-103 (1) (b) ) .
178U.C.C. s 3-103 (3) (c) .
179U.C.C. s 4-104 (c) .
180U.C.C. s 5-102 (a) (7) .
181U.C.C. s 8-102 (a) (10) .
This narrower definition in Article 5- -which does not include "fair
dealing"-- is considered "appropriate to the decision to honor or
dishonor a presentation of documents specified in a letter of credit"
.
But the scope of the application of this subjective definition is
relatively narrow, which "applies only to the extent that the
reimbursement contract [between the applicant and the issuer of letter
of credit] is governed by provisions in [Article 5]; for other purposes
good faith is defined by other law." U.C.C. s 5-102 Comment 3.
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other specific definitions contain an objective standard of
good faith- -reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. The April 1997 Draft Revision of Article 9 would
also add an objective definition to Article 9 of the U.C.C
requiring observance of reasonable commercial standards of
sz J 1 183fair dealing.
It is worth mentioning in particular that the 1990
revision made to article 3 (negotiable instrument) defines
good faith as "honesty in fact and observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." Based on this
definition, holders in due course are now subject to a test
of good faith that requires them to act according to
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. That means
good faith purchase, traditionally used in a subjective
sense, would also include an objective standard. This
revision has effectively mooted the base for application of
the "honesty in fact" standard in article 1 general
186definition. Furthermore, according to PEB Commentary
The American Law Institute, The Discussion Draft No. 2 of Uniform Commercial Code
Revised Article 9. 5 (April 14, 1997) .
84 See Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.)343 (1857). Following the
ruling in the 1836 England case Goodman v. Harvey(4 A. & E. 870, 111
Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836)), the Supreme Court of the United States
determined to adopt a subjective test for good faith purchase. Id. at
367-70.
85Early back to 1824, the England case Gill v. Gubitt (3B. & C. 466,
107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824)) ever introduced an objective test for
good faith purchase which required the holder to exercise the prudence
and caution of a reasonable man. But this objective test was overruled
in Goodman v. Harvey(4 A. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836)).
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No. 10, the subjective standard of good faith must also be
interpreted in light of the agreement of the parties, and
thus a purely subjective test would have less room to play
in evaluating good faith in the performance and enforcement
18 7
of a contract
.
As has been said, despite of the general applicability
of the subjective definition in article 1, an objective
concept of good faith has already extended to other
articles other than article 2. This suggests that the
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" is now
on its way to code-wide acceptance as a uniform standard
for good faith requirement
.
4. The scope of good faith obligation under the
U.C.C.
The objective good faith definition referred to
commercial reasonable standards is much broader than the
"honesty in fact" definition. Unlike the "honest in fact"
standard, which standing alone is simple and clear,
commercial reasonable standards are not fixed and vary with
context. With this open-ended definition, judges are
This revision to Article 3 actually undermined the argument by which
New Yorker bankers objected the inclusion of an objective standard
into the Article 1 general definition. See supra note 142.
PEB Commentary No. 10 Section 1-203, reprinted in Selected Commercial
Statutes 912, 912 (ed. 1994) [hereinafter PEB Commentary or Commentary]
.
According to the Commentary, to ascertain the parties' agreement,
courts need to look to their actual commercial background including
usage and practices. Thus the inquiry will necessarily involve with an
objective standard.
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allowed to determine the obligation of good faith by an ad
hoc review of facts of each case.
Nevertheless, there is a limitation on courts imposing
parties the good faith obligation under the U.C.C.. PEB
Commentary No. 10 on section 1-203 provides for an
"authoritative" explanation with regard to the nature and
scope of the Code's general obligation of good faith.
According to the Commentary, since the principle of good
faith serves to protect contract parties' reasonable
expectations and such expectations are the measure of
parties' good faith, good faith is considered as "a
concept with conceptual content related to that of
agreement" and it merely directs attention to the parties'
reasonable expectations. To determine whether a party
acts in good faith or not, a court should base its decision
on the parties' agreement. The court can determine the
content of the agreement by examining the commercial
Id. at 912-917. As to the persuasive influence of PEB commentaries,
see Julian B. McDonnell, Definition and Dialogue in Commercial Law, 89
Nw. U. L. Rev. 623, 625. (stating "when the P.E.B. speaks, the other
participants [including judges] in the dialogue listen.")
Id. at 913. (quoting Karl Llewellyn's explanation on the principle of
good faith)
.
190
Id.
Id. at 915. The concept "agreement" is defined in s 1-201(3), which
reads
:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other
circumstances including course of dealing or usage or
trade or course of performance as provided in this Act
(Sections 1-205 and 2-208)
.
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context in which the parties have developed their
reasonable contractual expectations. But the court may
not go beyond the "agreement" or contractual reasonable
expectations to impose parties an independent good faith
obligation, because good faith does not exist separately
from the underlying agreement
.
1! The Code's principle of
It should be noted here that the Code defines the closely related
concept -- "contract" - -as "the total legal obligation which results
from the parties' agreement . . . ." UCC s 1-201(11) (emphasis added).
192According to the definition of agreement, the parties' commercial
context may include "usage of trade, course of dealing, course of
performance and the surrounding circumstances as effective parts
thereof . . . ." UCC s 1-201 Comment 3.
193PEB Commentary supra note 187 at 915-916. Case law remains divided
as to whether there exists an independent duty that supports a
separate cause of action for its violation. Some courts have rejected
claims alleging breach of the duty of good faith. See e.g., Super Glue
Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car System, 517 NY Supp . 2d 764, 766, 132 App
.
Div. 2d 604 (1987) (finding "the Code does not permit recovery of money
damages for not acting in good faith where no other basis of recovery
is present"); Accord, Kaushal v. State Bank of India, No. 82-C-7414(ND
111, February 12, 1988) (dismissing the claim alleging damages for
breach of good faith duty); Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818,
821(Ala. App. 1976); Management Assistance, Inc. v. Computer
Dimensions, Inc., 546 F . Supp . 666 (N.D. Ga.1982), aff'd 141 F.2d
708 (11th Cir. 1984) . Conversely, some other courts have held that a
party who violates the duty of good faith commits an actionable breach
of contract. See e.g., Sons of Thunder, Inc., v. Borden, Inc., 1997 WL
104592 (N.J.) (requiring the defendant to pay $412,000 for its "breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" which is quite
apart from a breach-of -contract claim) ; Colorado Interstate Gas v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F.Suppl448, 1474-75 (D Wyo
1987) (recognizing a separate cause of action for breach of the good
faith duty); Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Company, Inc., 774 F.2d 895 (8th
Cir. 1985) (holding that Conoco' s breach of the good faith duty
required a conclusion that it had breached the contract); Best v. U.S.
National Bank 714 P. 2d 1049, 1056 (Or. App. 1986). Considering the
dependence of good faith to parties' contractual expectations and
agreement, the Commentary supports the former view and holds that
good faith is "not an independent source from which rights and duties
evolve." The Commentary further points out that the language ""every
contract or duty within this Act imposes . . ." in s 1-203 (emphasis
added) makes it clear that the obligation of good faith "extends only
to the rights and duties resulting from the parties' contract."
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good faith does not allow a court to depart from parties'
reasonable expectations and resort to principles of law or
equity outside the Code to create an obligation named by
good faith. 194 Thus, the scope of good faith obligation
under the U.C.C. is relatively narrower than German judge
extended by broadly interpreting BGB 242. The parties'
agreement or their reasonable contractual expectations
stands as a limit to the U.C.C. 's good faith obligation.
On the other hand, the scope of good faith obligation
may be extended beyond written terms of a contract . As
mentioned above, the U.C.C. adopted the principle of good
faith to protect the reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties. For such purpose, as Corbin writes:
. . . then at some point it become necessary
for courts to look to the substance rather than
to the form of the agreement, and to hold that
substance controls over form. What courts are
doing here, whether calling the process
"implication" of promises, or interpreting the
requirements of "good faith," as the current
fashion may be, is but a recognition that the
s
Id. at 916. The Commentary amended the Official Comment to s 1-203
by adding the following language:
This section does not support an independent cause of
action for failure to perform or enforce in good faith.
Rather, this section means that a failure to perform or
enforce, in good faith, a specific duty or obligation
under the contract, constitutes a breach of that contract
or makes unavailable, under the particular circumstances,
a remedial right or power. This distinction makes it clear
that the doctrine of good faith merely directs a court
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial
context in which they are created, performed, and
enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness
and reasonableness which can be independently breached.
Id. at 916-917.
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parties occasionally have understandings or
expectations that were so fundamental that they
did not need to negotiate about those
expectations. When the court "implies a promise"
or holds that "good faith" requires a party not
to violate those expectations, it is recognizing
that sometimes silence says more than words, and
it is understanding its duty to the spirit of the
bargain is higher than its duty to the
technicalities of the language.
This explanation has obtained recognition by the PEB
Commentary, which makes it clear that the requirement of
good faith relative to the agreement of the parties may
override the written terms in some circumstances . In
deciding whether a party has acted in good faith, a court
must first ascertain the substance of the parties'
agreement rather than look to the technicalities of
contractual language. Accordingly, the U.C.C. provides
for a broad concept of "agreement", ' which covers not only
the written terms but also a variety of elements including
course of dealing, ' usage of trade, and course of
See A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts s 570 (West Supp. 1993) .
PEB Commentary supra note 187, at 916. This is a controversial
issue. Utilitarian judges of the Chicago school dissent that the good
faith requirement can override the written terms. See Judge
Easterbrook' s opinion in Kham & Nate's Shoes No . 2 , Inc. v. First Bank
of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.1990). But on the other hind, the
New Jersy Borden case (See supra note 193) shows judicial support for
the PEB position.
191
Id.
19 8 See supra note 191.
199U.CC s 1-205 (1) .
200U.C.C s 1-205(2)
.
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performance. Courts need to synthesize all of those
elements to discern the agreement of the parties. Thus
the explicit contractual language is not always decisive to
determine parties' rights and duties; good faith obligation
requires parties to perform and enforce a contract in "a
way that recognizes that the agreement should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties in the light of the commercial
conditions existing in the context under scrutiny."
The scope of the general obligation of good faith
under the U.C.C. is also narrower than that in civil law
with respect to whether this general obligation extends to
the formation stage of contracts. While civil law countries
generally recognize and enforce a duty of good faith
negotiation, common law imposes no good faith obligation
prior to the execution of a contract. The traditional
201U.C.C. s 1-205(3)
'As to how express terms, course of dealing and usage of trade are to
be synthesized, s 1-205(3) (4) provides for guidance as follows:
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged
or of which they are or should be aware give particular
meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an
agreement
.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of trade and
course of dealing controls usage of trade.
PEB Commentary, supra note 187, at 916.
See supra note 106.
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common law view, sometimes referred to as the "aleatory-
view" of negotiations, holds that mere participation in
precontractual negotiations is not enough to create binding
obligations. 2 ' The underlying policy of this common law
2 6
view is to preserve the parties' freedom to negotiate and
to avoid discouraging parties from entering negotiations.
American courts have been reluctant to find a general
obligation to negotiate in good faith. This reluctance is
supported by the prevailing view that the general
obligation of good faith in both the U.C.C. and the
05Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements
:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 221 (1987)
.
According to the "aleatory view" , "a party that enters negotiations in
the hope of the gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears
the risk of whatever loss results if the other party breaks off the
negotiations." One English judge had a good expression as to this
view, stating that a party to negotiations "undertakes this work as a
gamble, and its cost is part of the overhead expense of his business
which he hopes will be met out of the profits of such contracts as are
made . . ."(citing William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. v. Davis, [1957] 1
W.L.R. 932, 934 (Q.B.)). Id.
Id. It can be seen that the parties' freedom to negotiate is
preserved at the risk that their negotiation efforts will go
uncompensated if negotiations fail.
Id. at 242-43. As to the negative effect of imposing a general
prcontractual obligation, Professor Farnsworth has more to say:
There is no reason to believe that imposition of a general
obligation of fair dealing would improve the regime under
which such negotiations take place. The difficulty of
determining a point in the negotiations at which the
obligation of fair dealing arises would create
uncertainty. An obligation of fair dealing might have an
undesirable chilling effect, discouraging parties from
entering negotiations if chances of success were slight.
The obligation might also have an undesirable accelerating
effect, increasing the pressure on parties to bring
negotiations to a final if hasty conclusion. With no clear
advantages to counter these disadvantages there is little
reason to abandon the present aleatory view.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not extend to the
negotiation stage. 208
However, this limitation concerning good faith
obligation does not necessitate the conclusion that a party
who acts in bad faith in negotiation is completely relieved
from any liabilities. Instead of using the general
obligation of good faith as the liability basis, American
courts impose parties the precontractual liability based on
more specific common law doctrines. 20 ' Courts may police the
bargaining process and strike or rewrite unfair agreement
by applying common law doctrines such as fraud and
duress, 210 unconscionability, 211 contract interpretation, 212
208 Id. at 239,
209According to U.C.C. s 1-103, courts can settle the issue by the
importation of outside common law doctrines.
210See Robert A. Hillman, Julian B. McDonnell & Steve H. Nickles, Common Law and
Equity Under the Uniform Commercial Code 6. 02 [2] [a] [i] (1984) . Fraud may be
found when there exists a material misrepresentation of fact and
reliance on that misrepresentation (citing Obsterberger v. Hites
Constr. Co., 599 SW 2d 221, 227 (Mo. Ct . App. 1980)); Duress can be
invoked to invalidate a contract where one contracting party commits
wrongful conduct which precludes the exercise of free will by the
other party (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Balistreri, 470 F.
Supp. 752, 758 (ED Wis. 1979)). Id.
2U Id. at 6.02[2]. The theory of unconscionability is codified in
section 2-302 of U.C.C, which authorizes courts to bar or limit the
enforcement of unfair contracts or contract clauses. According to
Professor Hillman, unconscionability has two major components: common
law doctrines unconscionability that includes common law and
equitable doctrines focusing on the issue of assent; and pure
unconscionability that merely involves the fairness of the resulting
terms of an agreement. When bargaining infirmity exists, courts often
resort to common law doctrines focusing on the issue of assent instead
of the unconscionability provision of section 2-302 to deal with
unconscionability cases.
212 Id. at 6.02 [2] [a] [ii] . Rules of contract interpretation require
that ambiguous or conflicting contract terms are construed against the
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the duty to disclose. 213 A disappointed party my also claim
remedy based on restitution, misrepresentation, or promise
reliance theory when the negotiation fails and no contract
exists between the parties. 214 Professor Hillman argues in
favor of applying those specific common law doctrines to
the bargaining process rather than a general principle of
good faith on the ground that their application would
increase the clarity of decisions . In contrast the good
faith principle, which directly employs a fairness
standard, could be seen as more obscure and unfocused.
Professor Farnsworth also argues that those specific common
drafter of the contract (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. 350 F 2d 445 (DC Cir. 1965). Id.
13
Id. at 6.02 [2] [a] [iii] . Traditionally, parties to business
transactions were not required to disclose all material information
unknown to the other party before the transactions is consummated. See
Laidlaw v. Organ 15 U.S. (2 Wheat. )178, 195 (1817). But currently some
courts employ the duty-to-disclose doctrine to protect parties to
standardized agreements when the drafters do not play fairly. For
example, the duty to disclose can be imposed "when a party with
superior knowledge of facts, 'resulting in an inequality of condition
or knowledge between the parties,' fails to disclose important facts
regarding the surrounding circumstances of a bargain to the other
party." (Smith v. Peterson, 282 NW 2d 761, 767 (Iowa 1980)). However,
courts are still less likely to impose such disclosure duty in
commercial cases where a party has invested resources or incurred
costs to acquire the imformation. See Anthony Kronman, Mistake,
Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. of Legal Studies,
1, 13, 18 (1978) .
14See generally Farnsworth, supra note 205, at 229-240. As to imposing
precontractual liability based on restitution theory, see e.g., Hill
v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956); Precontractual liability
based on misrepresentation theory, see, Markov v. ABC Transfer &
Storage Co., 467 P. 2d 535 (1966); Precontractual liability based on
detrimental reliance theory, see Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d
267 (1965)
.
215
Hillman, McDonnell & Nickles supra note 210 at 6.02 [2] [c] .
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law doctrines are adequate to protect parties from the bad
faith behavior in the negotiation stage, thereby the
imposition of a general obligation of good faith in the
formation of contracts is superfluous. However, it is
not clear at all that the common law doctrines can cover
all cases of improper conduct in the formation of a
contract
.
It is worth noting that the new 1997 draft provision s
2-105, dealing with unconscionable contract or term,
includes a new phrase "induced by unconscionable
conduct." 217 This phrase was added and approved at the
American Law Institute's Annual Meeting of the Conference
218in July, 1996. By this phrase, the codified
unconscionability doctrine extends to deal with the
negotiation conduct which is unconscionable or induces an
unsconscionable contract or term. This doctrine, which is
formulated more generally than those specific common
doctrines, may have the same effect as the general
Farnsworth, supra note 2 05, at 285.
17
The American Law Institute, supra note 53 at 11. The draft provision s 2-
105(a) reads as follows:
(a) If a court finds as a matter of law that a contract or
a term thereof was unconscionable at the time it was made
or was induced by unconscionable conduct, the court may-
refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of
the contract without the term, or so limit the application
of the term to avoid an unconscionable result, (emphasis
added)
This draft provision is the same as s 2-302 in the 1996 Official Text,
except for the newly added phrase "induced by unconscionable conduct."
Id. at 12.
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principle of good faith has in dealing with unconscionable
conduct in the contract formation. The new development
suggests that the U.C.C. may be moving in the direction of
imposing a general obligation on parties at the negotiation
stage
.
B. Good faith in English Law
In contrast with the development in the United States,
good faith has met with a considerable resistance in
English law. Although as far as back 1766 Lord Mansfield
referred to good faith as "[t]he governing principle . . .
applicable to all contracts and dealings," this principle
never sprouted roots and grew in England. ' In the English
law of contract, there is no general obligation to observe
good faith in performance or enforcement of a contract
.
As Lord Justice Bingham has said:
"English law has, characteristically, committed
itself to no such overriding principle [of good
faith] but has developed solutions in response to
demonstrated problems of unfairness."
219Carter v. Boehm, 97 Eng . Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B. 1766) .
Johan Steyn, The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract
Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy, 1991 Denning L.J. 131, 138. Lord
Mansfield's view in Carter case was soon rejected and the duty of
"utmost good faith" remains attached only to the contract of
insurance; thus traditionally, English lawyers have been unreceptive
to a general principle of good faith. Id.
1Powell, supra note 95 at 25. Professor Raphael Powell maintained
that there was in English law "no overriding general positive duty of
good faith imposed on the parties to a contract."
22Interfoto Library Ltd. v. Stilleto Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 154
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In the absence of a general principle of good faith,
English law has to resort to some technical doctrines,^
such as the implication of contractual terms or promissory-
estoppel, 4 to deal with those demonstrated problems of
unfairness. Under the implication doctrine, for example, by
reason of special circumstances of a particular contract, a
court may imply a term from local custom ' or mercantile
2 2 6
usage to implement the supposed intention of parties; by
reason of the nature of the contract, a court may imply a
duty to cooperate where the contract cannot be performed
without cooperation. ' Through such implication, the court
actually imposed a standard of "fairness" or
"reasonableness" in the performance of a contract.
This technical substitute for a more general principle
of good faith, however, is limited to promoting
"fairness" or "reasonableness" . As Professor Raphel
230' Connor, supra note 77, at 19
Id. at 20. The invention of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
considered as a bold example of the courts indirectly imposing a good
faith requirement through the device of a technical rule in order to
enforce a gratuitous promise without support of consideration. See
Foakes v. Beer [1884] 9 App . Cases 605; Central London Property Trust
Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130.
2S
Id. at 19. citing Hutton v. Warren (1836) 1 M. & W. 466; 150 E.R.
517.
Id. citing Laing v. Fidgeon (1815) 6 Taunton, 108; 128 E.R. 974.
27Steyn supra note 220, at 133. citing MacKay v. Dick (1881) 6 App
Cas. 251.
22B0' Connor, supra note 77, at 19.
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Powell said, by using a roundabout route, an English court
can in many cases reach the same result as a foreign court
applying the principle of good faith. But as professor
Powell noted, in a number of cases the rule requiring good
faith has enabled the foreign court to adjust relations
between the parties more equitably than an English court in
22 9
similar circumstances. ' For example, under English law,
the implication of terms into a contract is subject to the
rule that a term cannot generally be implied so as to
supersede the written terms of the contract
.
Still the English judiciary and lawyers insist on
their "jaundiced" view on the general principle of good
faith. ' In 1979, UK delegation fiercely opposed a proposal
to introduce a general obligation of good faith into the
23 2Vienna Sales Convention. This opposition is consistent
with the concept of good faith formulated in the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 of England. 233 In the Act "good faith" is
essentially limited to "honesty in fact" . 4 This concept of
Powell supra note 95, at 25.
30O'Connor Supra note 77, at 19, citing Les Affreteurs Reunis S.A. v.
Leopold Walford (London) Ltd. [1919] A.C. 801.
1Steyn, supra note 220, at 133.
Eorsi, supra note 5, at pp. 2- 7.
33The Sale of Goods Act 1979 replaces the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and
consolidates the enactments comprising the general law relating to the
sale of goods
.
By section 61(3), a thing is deemed to be done "in good faith"
within the meaning of the Act when it is in fact done honestly,
whether it is done negligently or not.
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"good faith" is merely used as a rule to decide whether a
good title is acquired with regard to a sale in market
overt. 2 ' The Act does not invoke "good faith" to deal with
2 3 6
unfair or unreasonable conduct by seller or buyer. ' Thus
it fails to support an imposition of a general duties of
good faith to contract
.
However, there are signs that English law may become
more receptive to the notion of good faith. Guided by Lord
Reid's dictum that "the common law ought never to produce a
wholly unreasonable result . . .", a new generation of
English judges has come to look beyond the traditional
confines of English law and to embrace a more fair and just
23 8
solution. ' When delivering the 1991 Royal Bank of Scotland
Law Lecture at the University of Oxford, Justice Johan
Steyn stated that "[t]he aim of any mature system of
contract law must be to promote the observance of good
faith and fair dealing in the conclusion and performance of
contracts" and urged that "in using the high technique of
common law the closest attention . .
.
[be] paid to the
purpose of the law of contract . . . . " 239
350' Connor, supra note 77, at 39-41.
236 ,. ,Id. at 41
37Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd., [1963] A.C. 758,772.
D. J. Freeman, Burning Question of Unfairness, Financial times (London)
,
February 27, 1992, at 20.
39Steyn, supra note 220, at 131, 141
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C. Good faith in other common law countries
As to the admission of the notion of good faith, other
common law countries do not look to England, the
traditional fount of common law notions; they cast their
eyes on the development of good faith principle in the
United States
.
Australia is a leading example. In 1989, Professor
Paul Finn of the Australian National University pointed out
"doctrine of 'good faith' in contract performance is now
2 41
squarely upon contract's agenda." Judicial recognition of
this doctrine is reflected in several recent cases.
Renard Constructions (ME) v. Minister for Public
Works is a decision issued by Justice L.J. Priestley of
the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. This case
involved the exercise of powers of termination in a
construction contract. ' Justice Priestley held that such
Australia became the Contracting State of the Vienna Sales
Convention on March 17, 1988.
Paul D. Finn, Commerce, the Common Law and Morality, 17 Melb . U.L.
REV. 87, 89 (1989) .
24226 N.S.W.L.R. 234 (1992).
In 1989, Justice L.J. Priestley described the doctrine of good faith
as a "feature ... of much United States contract law" and wondered
whether "Australian law has reached the point where terms may readily
be implied into contracts, having substantially the same effect as the
good faith formulation in the United States." See L.J. Priestley, A
Guide to Comparison of Australian and United States Contract Law, 12
U.N.S.W. L.J. 4, 17, 23 (1989).
**Renard Constructions, N.S.W.L.R. at 234.
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contractual powers were to be exercised reasonably and
honestly, and the requirement of reasonableness had much in
common with the notion of good faith which were regarded in
many of the civil law systems of Europe and in the United
States. 245 After reviewing American and other sources of
authorities on good faith, Judge Priestly concluded:
People generally, including judges and other
lawyers, from all strands of the community, have
grown used to the courts applying standards of
fairness to contracts which are wholly consistent
with the existence in all contracts of a duty
upon the parties of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance.
It is obvious that here Judge Priestly linked the
reasonableness with good faith, and employed an objective
standard equivalent to that American judges use in deciding
requirements contract cases in the U.C.C. context.
In a more recent case Service Station Ass'n v. Berg
• 248Bennett & Associates , Gummow J, now a Justice of the High
Court of Australia, made three important points on good
faith. The first point is that the law on implied terms
required for the "business efficacy" of a contract is
otiose if the same ground could be covered by an implied
2i5
Id. at 263, 264
It is worth mentioning that Judge Priestly made express reference to
the good faith principle of CISG Article 7(1) as a precedent to
Australian law.
247
Id. at 268.
24845 F.C.R. 84 (N.S.W. Dist . Reg. 1993).
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'good faith" term. 249 Secondly, Gummow J pointed out that
the concept of good faith is imprecise, whereas "bad faith"
is not; it is easier to identify examples of bad behavior
than to postulate a standard of good faith behavior in
positive terms. ' The third point is that Anglo-Australian
law has developed differently from American law on implied
terms, with greater emphasis on specifics rather than the
identification of a principle expressed in wide terms.
Gummow J said that equity played a role in determining the
quality of performance, but it "require [d] a leap of faith
to translate these well-established doctrines and remedies
into a new term as to the quality of contractual
2 52performance, implied by law."
The principle of good faith can also be seen as
emerging in Canadian contract law. In 1979, the Ontario
Law Reform Commission's Report on Sale of Goods suggested
the adoption of a good faith standard in the performance
and enforcement of contracts. In terms equivalent to
section 2-103 of the U.C.C., the report defined good faith
249
Id. at 96.
2 50This formulation is in line with Professor Summer's
conceptualization of good faith. See Summers, supra note 69, at 200-
207.
2S1Service Station Ass'n, 45 F.C.R. at 96.
2S2
Id. at 97.
"Canada became the Contracting State of CISG on 23 April 1991.
"Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods 163-169
(1979)
.
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as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
standards of fair dealing." In 1987, the Commission's
Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract recommended that
legislation recognize a general principle of good faith,
and this recommendation formulated the good faith provision
in the same way as that in the American Restatement of
_ 256Contract
.
2SS id.
2 56Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of
Contract 165, 176 (1987) .
V. GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE IN UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
drafted by the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law, 2 constitute the latest effort at unifying
the substantive law applicable to international commercial
contracts. UNIDROIT Principles, in contrast to the Vienna
Sales Convention, are not a treaty but merely a set of
rules without binding power for either individuals or
states. Viewed as an international restatement of
contract law, the Principles are intended to enunciate
common principles and rules to the existing legal systems
and to provide the solutions that are best adapted to the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial Contract (1994)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles or the Principles] . The Principles
are the outcome of 14 years of intensive effort by a special Working
Group set up by the Governing Council of the Institute. The members of
the Working Group were leading experts in the field of contract law
and international trade law from all parts of the world, representing
all major families of law.
:58Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1121, 1122.
Because of their nature of lack of binding power, UNIDROIT Principles
are not prepared for adoption by national governments or legislatures.
They are expected to be applied in practice by reason of their
persuasive value only.
59Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts : Sphere of Application and General
Provisions 13 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 381, 387-389. It is found that
the Principles closely resemble Restatement Second of Contract of
America, by their manner of presentation, their objectives, and their
content. Id.
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special requirements of international commercial
contracts. 2 ' The scope of the Principles is not limited,
like the Convention, to sales contracts, but cover the
2 61
whole area of contract law for international commerce.
Good faith and fair dealing is one of the basic ideas
underlying the UNIDROIT Principles. ' The Principles deal
with this notion in Article 1.7. It states that " [e] ach
party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing in international trade," and " [t] he parties may not
2 6 3
exclude or limit this duty." Unlike the Convention's
good faith provision, Article 1.7 of the Principles
clearly imposes a general obligation of good faith and fair
dealing on contracting parties. Good faith has been
explicitly established as a mandatory standard for the
parties to follow.
260Bonell, supra note 258, at 1129.
1Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, supra note 269 at 390-395. The
Preamble of the Principles indicates their scope, stating "set forth
general rules for international commercial contracts."
The comments to Article 1.7 refer to a number of provisions
throughout the UNIDROIT Principles, which either directly or
indirectly apply the principle of good faith and fair dealing.
See, e.g. arts. 2.4(2) (b), 2.15, 2.16, 2.18, 2.20, 3.5, 3.8, 3.10,
4.1(2), 4.2(2), 4.6, 4.8, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1.3, 6.1.5, 6.1.16(2),
6.1.17(1), 6.2.3 (3)
- (4) , 7.1.2, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7 . 2 . 2 (b) - (c) , 7.4.8,
7.4.13 .
263UNIDROIT Principles, art. 1.7.
As to good faith as a mandatory standard, the formulation of the
second paragraph of art 1.7 is similar to Section 1-102(3) of U.C.C.,
which provides that the obligation of good faith "may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
75
Three features are striking about this provision.
First of all, it makes no attempt to define good faith
except to the extent that it is coupled with the expression
"fair dealing". Nevertheless, the term "fair dealing",
which is essentially a synonym for "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing" referred to elsewhere in the
same Principles, ' makes it clear that good faith is to be
understood in an objective sense, but not in a subjective
2 6 6
sense as a state of mind or just 'acting honestly."
The second feature is that the operation of the
principle of good faith and fair dealing is not confined to
the performance and enforcement of contracts as in common
law. 267 The UNIDROIT Principles apply this principle
throughout the life of the contract, including the
negotiation process. ' The duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the formation of the contract is expressly set
forth in Article 2.15, which provides:
(1)A party is free to negotiate and is not liable
for failure to reach an agreement
.
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." U.C.C. 1-
102 (3) .
See, e.g. Article 3.5 requires a party to call a mistake of the
other party to the latter' s attention if it is "contrary to reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing to leave the mistaken party in
error." Article 3.10 provides that a court may, upon a request by the
party entitled to avoidance, adapt the contract or term to "make it
accord with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
266Bonell, supra note 258, at 1138.
See discussion supra pp. 61-65.
268 UNIDROIT Principles art. 1.7 cmt . 1
.
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(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off
negotiations in bad faith is liable for the
losses caused to the other party.
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to
enter into or continue negotiations intending not
2 6 9
to reach an agreement with the other party.
Here the Principles first recognize the freedom to
negotiate, showing deference to common law's "aleatory"
view of negotiations. ' But subsequently the subsection (2)
limits such freedom by negatively imposing parties a duty
to negotiate in good faith. This formulation would be more
acceptable to civil law.
The third feature of Article 1.7 is that the inclusion
of the language "in international trade" sets forth a
context- -international trade-- in which the meaning of
2 72good faith and fair dealing are construed. This directs
a court to look at the special conditions of international
trade to determine what constitutes good faith and fair
dealing. The court should not apply the good faith
269
Id. art. 2.15
See supra note 2 05.
Common law commentators note that this formulation follows the
civil law approach. See Farnsworth, supra note 31, at 63.
7
This formulation is similar to U.C.C. article 2 definition which
includes the language "in the trade" . These language directs attention
to the particulars of the transaction being considered and not to some
general concept of fairness. In contrast, the good faith provision in
Restatement Second of Contract gives no contextual clarification to
the good faith and fair dealing, see Section 205 of Restatement Second
of Contract
.
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principle according to the standards originally adopted
within different legal systems.
As can be seen, the principle of good faith is more
effectively incorporated in the UNIDROIT Principles than
under the Convention, without containing an awkward
compromise between opposing civil law and common law views.
This formulation, reflecting to larger extent common
approaches applied by national laws, may provide us some
guidance to construe the good faith principle under the
Convention.
73UNIDROIT Principles art . 1 . 7 cmt . 2
VI. CONSTRUING GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE UNDER THE CONVENTION
With the foregoing comparative review of issues
concerning good faith principle in civil law system, common
law system, and the UNIDROIT Principles, we are now on
firmer ground to construe the good faith principle in the
uniform international sales law.
As argued in the Chapter II, good faith under the
Convention should be established as a general principle
concerned with parties' contractual behavior. Through our
comparative study, we have found that imposing an
affirmative obligation of good faith on contracting parties
has been a common approach employed by various legal
systems in formulating the principle of good faith. This
common point provides strong support for broadly reading
article 7(1) so as to direct good faith requirement not
only to interpreting judges but also to parties to
international sales contracts.
274 See discussion supra part B in Chapter II.
275Among major legal systems
,
only England has not recognized a
general duty of good faith. However, the development of good faith
principle in other common law countries and at the international
level has not gone unnoticed in England. English judges have been
getting increasingly receptive to the general principle of good faith.
See supra text accompanying notes 237-239.
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In the following discussion, we can also find the
"common core" or the shared basis among national law for
construing the concept of good faith and the scope of good
faith obligation under the Convention.
A. Good faith concept and reasonableness standard
As mentioned before, the concept of good faith remains
undefined under the Convention. To construe the undefined
concept involves two questions: what method should be taken
to treat the Convention's good faith concept, and what
meaning should be given to this concept? National
approaches discussed before have provided some guidance and
common bases to deal with the two questions in the uniform
law.
It has been a shared view between civil law and
common law that the definition of good faith should be
kept open-ended in order to make the principle of good
2 76faith do its job. Rather than ascribing any particular
meaning to the concept of good faith, both civil law and
common law systems only link the good faith with common
usage or commercial reasonable standards, at least in the
context of good faith performance. This linkage
2 76 See discussion supra part A in Chapter III and text accompanying
note 170.
I77A1 though the U.C.C.'s good faith definitions refer to "honest in
fact" besides reasonable commercial standards, the former can be
actually subsumed under the latter because a behavior that fails to
meet "honest in fact" standard can not definitely satisfy a commercial
reasonable standard.
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characterizes good faith as an objective concept. Using the
amorphous objective standard, judges can give good faith
specific meanings according to the circumstances of each
particular case, all of which can not be completely covered
by a single general definition of good faith. Thus as to
legislative formulation of good faith concept, it is
unnecessary and inappropriate to provide the concept with a
fixed meaning. Any defining attempt to go beyond setting
forth good faith as an objective concept can only limit or
2 7 8
even distort the role of good faith principle. This
consensus has been endorsed by UNIDROIT Principles in their
. 279good faith provision.
The undefined status of good faith under the
Convention happens to be consistent with national
treatments to the concept . So we need not consider to
construct a general definition for good faith under the
Convention. The only issue we must ascertain is what
standard, objective or subjective, should be used to
evaluate the good faith under the Convention.
Good faith under the Convention should be treated as
an objective concept. This treatment does not only reflect
7 ft Cithe common core among national laws, but is also
2 78 See supra text accompanying notes 166-168.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-66.
280 See discussion supra part C in Chapter III, and Part A in Chapter
IV regarding to erosion of the subjective standard.
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supported by the pervasive application of the
2 81
"reasonableness" standard under the Convention. In the
Convention's provisions applying the good faith principle,
the "reasonableness" standard such as "reasonable time"
,
"reasonable steps" or "unreasonable expense" is explicitly
2 8 2
required to measure the parties' contractual dealing. To
determine what is "reasonable," judges need to ascertain
2 83
what is "normal and acceptable in the relevant trade."
This demands that they consider all relevant commercial
circumstances of the case including usages and
practices, 24 especially the special conditions and
2 8 5
requirements of international trade. Thus to conform with
L Professor Schlechtriem suggests that good faith should be construed
in the light of numerous references to the "reasonableness" standard.
See Schlechtriem supra note 10, at 39. As for references to this
"reasonableness" standard, Professor Honnold has provided a list: Arts
8(2), 16(b) (Reasonable reliance), Art. 18 (2) (reasonable time), Art. 34
(unreasonable inconvenience or expense), Art. 35 (2) (b) (unreasonable to
rely), Art. 37 (unreasonable inconvenience or expense), Art. 38 (3)
(reasonable opportunity for examination), Art. 39(1) (reasonable time),
Art. 48 (2) (reasonable time), Art. 49 (2) (reasonable time), Art. 60 (a)
(acts reasonably expected), Art. 63(1) (reasonable time), Art. 72
(reasonable time for notice), Art . 75 (reasonable time and manner),
Art. 76 (2) (reasonable substitute), Art. 79(1) (reasonable
expectations), Art. 79(40) (reasonable time), Art. 85 (reasonable
steps), Art 86(1) (reasonable steps), Art. 86(2) (unreasonable
inconvenience or expense), Art. 88(1) (unreasonable delay), Art. 88(2)
(unreasonable expense; reasonable measures to sell) . Honnold, supra note
9 at 148.
See supra note 45, particularly art. 48, art. 85, and art. 88.
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Honnold, supra note 9 at 148.
CISG Art. 8(3). As to interpretation of statements or other conduct
of a party, this section demands that "due consideration is to be
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between
themselves, upsurges and any subsequent conduct of the parties."
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the Convention's good faith requirement, the parties to a
international sales contract must conduct themselves
according to the reasonable commercial standards of fair
2 8 6dealing in international trade.
Since commercial reasonableness is not a fixed
standard and may vary with context, it does not freeze the
flexibility that the principle of good faith is expected to
provide courts to deal with changing circumstances. On the
other hand, this objective standard directs judges'
attention to outside commercial background of contracting
parties, and thus it prevents judges from indulging their
subjective whim. Moreover, the vagueness concerning with
the good faith concept would be reduced by recognizing the
reasonable commercial standards because they distinguish
2 8 7good faith from other ethical norms. Thus, judges are not
allowed to invoke any local ethical system standards to
evaluate the behavior of contracting parties.
5Bonell, supra note 16 at 87. It is suggested that "in the context of
the Convention the principle of good faith must be construed in the
light of the special conditions and requirements of international
trade." Id.
This standard is consistent with that formulated in UNIDROIT
Principles. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
Max Weber, supra note 6 at 636-637. Weber pointed out that the market
community is the most impersonal relationship of practical life into
which humans can enter with one another and "[i]n sharp contrast to
all other groups which always presuppose some measure of personal
fraternization or even blood kinship, the market is fundamentally
alien to any type of fraternal relationship." Thus, the reasonable
commercial standards, which are developed in the market community as
the content of market ethics and follow their own rational legality,
should not be confused with fraternal ethics or any other ethical
standards
.
Id.
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B. The scope of good faith obligation
National laws remain divided as to the scope of good
faith obligation. The principle of good faith in civil law
performs expansive functions that impose independent
duties and extend the scope of good faith obligation beyond
the existing contractual relationship between parties.
While in common law, the general obligation of good faith
exists depending on the underlying agreement of parties and
it does not extend to the formation stage of contract.
The omission of any language under the Convention
addressing the legal obligation of good faith was mainly
due to the above unsettled division among two systems.
But we still can find some clues and common bases from the
differing treatments of the two legal systems to define the
scope of good faith obligation under the Convention.
1
.
Good faith in performance and enforcement of
contract
.
In the context of contract performance and
enforcement, both civil law and common law recognize the
See discussion supra part D in Chapter III.
28 9See discussion supra part A in Chapter concerning the scope of good
faith obligation.
See discussion supra part A in Chapter II.
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imposition of a general obligation of good faith. This
obligation is imposed in both systems to protect parties'
reasonable contractual expectations.
The protection of reasonable expectation of
contracting parties is one of basic values underlying the
Convention. : The application of the principle of good
faith in the Convention's numerous provisions serves to
preserve this value. For example, the good faith duty in
Article 29 precludes a party from relying on a provision in
a contract that requires written evidence of modifications
if the party's conduct indicates that he has agreed to a
contract modification, so as to protect the opposite
party's reliance or reasonable expectations based on such
conduct. Similarly, Article 8 provides that statements
and conduct should be interpreted according to the
reasonable understanding of the other party. Implicit in
English law is an exception, see discussion supra part B in Chapter
IV.
19 Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of
the United Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. Int'l l.& Bus. 574, 595
(1988)
.
293CISG art. 29(2). This section reads as follow:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring
any modification or termination by agreement to be in
writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by
agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his
conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that
the other party has relied on that conduct.
CISG art. 8(1) ("For the purposes of this Convention statements made
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his
intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what
that intent was.")
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this rule is that a party is subject to the duty to conduct
himself with concern of other party's reasonable
expectations created by his words and behavior.
The linkage between good faith and reasonable
contractual expectations dictates the confines of the good
faith obligation under the Convention. In international
sales transactions governed by the Convention, parties'
contractual obligations are decided by the requirements of
the contract and the Convention. Besides the contract
terms, the Convention provides that parties are also bound
by the usages and practices applicable to their contractual
dealings. ' All of the contract terms, applicable usages
and practices together determine the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties. Contracting parties
are subject to no obligations that are outside of their
reasonable expectations. This is clearly demonstrated in
Article 35(3) of the Convention, which provides that " [t] he
5See CISG art. 30. ("The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any
documents relating to them and transfer the property in the goods, as
required by the contract and this Convention.
"
(emphasis added)); CISG
Art. 53 ("The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery
of them as required by the contract and this Convention." (emphasis
added) )
.
96CISG art. 9. This article reads as follows:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have
agreed and by any practices which they have established
between themselves
.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed,
to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its
formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to
have known and which in international trade is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts
of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.
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seller is not liable . . . for any lack of conformity of the
goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the
buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of
conformity .
"
2i In this case of the provision, since the
buyer does not reasonably expect that the seller would
provide goods in conformity with the contract, the
Convention does not impose the seller any liability that
goes beyond the buyers' reasonable expectations concerning
the quality or quantity of the goods. Thus the obligations
of contracting parties merely exist in the limit of their
reasonable expectations. This limitation should also apply
to the obligation of good faith imposed on parties.
One may have found that this limitation of good faith
obligation is actually in line with the common law
approach, which applies the principle of good faith more
2 9 8
narrowly than civil law. Interpreting the Convention's
good faith obligation in this way is consistent with its
aim to promote uniform application. First, civil law agrees
with common law in that protecting the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties is one of major
functions of good faith principle, but beyond contractual
expectations both systems can hardly reach an agreement
with regard to the imposition of good faith obligation.
Thus, only allowing the Convention's good faith principle
297CISG art. 35(3) .
2 98See supra text accompanying notes 18 9-194
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to operate in the limit of contractual expectations can
assure the uniform application of this principle in both
civil and common courts. Secondly, the limitation on good
faith obligation directs courts' attention to parties'
reasonable expectations and their actual international
commercial background to find a just resolution. This will
help the Convention's good faith, through international
case law development, to develop as a uniform principle
that corresponds with the special requirements and
conditions of international trade. If following the civil
law approach, however, national courts would be left free
to impose the good faith obligation without limitation or
any uniform guidance. This will necessarily cause more
uncertainty and confusion than German judges did in
revalorization cases because of the great incongruity among
national laws.
2. Good faith and precontractual liability in the
formation of contract
The application of good faith principle to the
formation of contract is perhaps the most difficult and
controversial issue under the Convention. A draft provision
of the Convention concerning good faith and fair dealing in
contract formation was omitted from the final version. 2
This omission evidences the vigorous division among
national laws with regard to the imposition of
299See supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
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precontractual liability. It has been argued that the
omission also clearly demonstrates that the drafters of the
Convention preferred to leave the issue to the existing
non-unified domestic laws. ' ' According to this argument,
the principle of good faith under the Convention does not
apply to the formation of contract.
This argument is questionable. Even though some
countries refuse to impose a general obligation of good
faith in contract formation, they do not deny that parties
in negotiating a contract may be subject to some
precontractual liability. The precontractual liability is
based on various theories in different countries. Under the
Convention, the fact that no provision explicitly deals
with the precontractual liability of contracting parties
does not necessarily mean that this issue should be
completely settled by national laws. To analyze this issue
in the Convention context, we need to proceed our
discussion in two distinct scenarios.
The first scenario involves the precontractual
liability when a contract is concluded. A party to a
concluded contract may be subject to the precontractual
liability if he employs improper means in order to induce
the other party to enter into the contract which, under
Michael Bonell, Formation of Contracts and Precontractual Liability
under the Vienna Convention on International Sale of Goods, in Formation
of Contracts and Precontractual Liability 167 (ICC, 1990) .
See supra text accompanying notes 209-214.
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normal circumstance, would not have concluded at all or
would have concluded on different terms. National laws base
this liability on doctrines of fraud, duress or
unconscionability, all of which justify judges to
invalidate the contract. ' In civil law countries, these
doctrines related to contract validity are often subsumed
under the single principle of good faith, thus
precontractual liability at this scenario can be
established by applying the general principle of good faith
instead of those specific validity doctrines. ' This
approach is unacceptable to common law countries where the
principle of good faith is not used to deal with the
contractual validity issue. 4 Under the Convention,
however, this unsettled division among national laws does
not present the problem of uniformity because Article 4
expressly states that the issue of the validity of the
contract falls outside the scope of the Convention. It
See supra notes 210-213
In German law, for example, although fraud, duress, and
unconscionable conducts are dealt with under specific provisions of
the BGB, the wide meaning of justice and fairness given to article 242
have influenced courts to use the "wide and all-embracing" principle
of good faith to envelop those doctrines of contractual validity. See
O'Connor supra note 77, at 88; see also Farnsworth, supra note 31 at 60-
61.
4See Farnsworth, supra note 31 at 60-61.
CISG art. 4 (a) . It provides that the Convention is not concerned with
"the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any
usage." By this provision, the Convention pays deference to the
autonomy of individual states with regard to their important policies
concerning contractual validity. Although the exact definition of
"validity" is not addressed under the Convention, it is recognized
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follows that the Convention and its good faith principle do
not apply to the parties' negotiating behavior which
involves with the validity of a contract. Thus, the
precontractual liability at this scenario is a issue
subject to applicable national laws.
The second scenario concerns the precontractual
liability when no contract concluded. The common law and
civil law have differing views with regard to the basis for
imposing the precontractual liability at this scenario. The
common law does not accept the civil law approach
establishing the general obligation of good faith as the
basis for the precontractual liability. Instead, common law
only allows the precontratual liability based on some
specific doctrines such as restitution, misrepresentation
or promise reliance. The reluctance of common law to
impose a general obligation in the precontractual
negotiation is due to its concern not to interfere the
freedom of negotiation.
As far as the Convention is concerned at the second
scenario, it is necessary to scrutinize two formation
that judicial concerns about fraud, duress and unconscionability are
clearly relevant to determinations of contractual validity. See John
Klein, Good Faith in International Transactions , 15 Liverpool L. Rev.
115, 124 (1993) .
See Bonell, supra note 230, at 169.
See supra note 214.
3 08 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
provisions that the Secretariat Commentary gives as
examples for the application of good faith principle under
the Convention. 3 ' ' Article 16(2) (b) provides that "[an offer
cannot be revoked] if it was reasonable for the offeree to
rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has
acted in reliance on the offer." The offeror's
precontractual duty not to revoke the offer that has been
reasonably relied by the offeree, which is based on the
principle of good faith as the Secretary Commentary
indicates, may be imposed by common law on the ground of
promise reliance. Article 21(2) imposes on the offeror
another duty, when an acceptance is late due to abnormal
transmission, to promptly inform the offeree of his intent
to treat the acceptance as effective or, alternately, as
ineffective because the offer has lapsed. The imposition
of this duty may also be demanded in common law by its
misrepresentation theory. These applications of good
faith principle to establish precontractual liability under
the Convention demonstrate that they do not produce
unacceptable results to common law. Moreover, as one
common law scholar observes, the effect that civil law
See supra note 4 5
310CISG art. 16 (2)
See supra note 214
312CISG art. 21 (2)
See supra note 214
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imposes precontractual liability based on the principle of
good faith does not go beyond what common law does on other
grounds. 314 Therefore, imposing a general obligation in the
Convention's contract formation at the second scenario will
not necessarily do more harm to the common law value of
freedom to negotiate.
Furthermore, imposing the good faith obligation in
precontractual negotiation is justified by gap-filling
provision Article 7(2) . Since Article 7 is one of the
Convention's general provisions that governs all the
Convention's substantive provisions, including contract
formation provisions. Good faith established as a general
principle by Article 7(2) naturally applies to the
formation of contract. Thus, at the second scenario, the
314Farnsworth, supra note 205, at 239-240. Professor Farnsworth states
that "even in Europe it is difficult to find cases that actually
impose precontractual liability where an American court would clearly
no do so on other grounds .
"
The good faith obligation in formation of contract is not intended
to completely limit the freedom of negotiation because this obligation
does not make the parties liable for failure to conclude a contract
once they enter into negotiations. The requirements of the
precontractual obligation of good faith depend on the circumstances of
each case, including usage's and practices in relevant trade. In
imposing such obligation, close attention should also be paid to the
balance between promoting fair dealing in the formation of contract
and preserving the freedom of negotiation. The formulation of
precontractual good faith obligation in UNIDROIT Principles well
reflects this balance. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
Actually, common courts have not ignored this balance because they do
limit the parties' freedom of negotiation in appropriate cases by
applying some specific doctrines to impose precontractual liability.
Moreover, there are signs that common law may also impose a general
obligation on negotiating parties, see supra notes 217, 218 and
accompanying text
.
316 CISG art. 7 (2) .
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negotiating behavior of parties should be subject to the
obligation of good faith under the Convention.
In sum, good faith principle under the Convention
applies to the formation of contract as the basis of
precontractual liability; but this principle does not deal
with parties' negotiating activities concerned with the
validity of the contract, which makes its application much
narrower than that in civil law. Obviously, this limited
application will leave a lot of precontractual bad faith
behavior settled by applicable national law rather than the
Convention's good faith principle. But due to the sharp
division among national laws and the Convention's
restriction from dealing with the contractual validity
issue, this is perhaps the best resolution we can achieve
at present
.
C. Applications of good faith principle in the
Convention's provisions
As said before, good faith principle has been
pervasively applied under the Convention. An examination of
A question that is much likely to be asked here is what remedies are
available for the breach of good faith obligation when no contract is
concluded. This question is certainly not easy to answer because all
remedy provisions under the Convention deal with the breach of an
obligation arising out a contract that has been concluded. However, it
has been suggested that this issue could be resolved by applying some
of the Convention's provisions on remedies by analogy. For example, an
offeree may recover reliance damage if the offeror revokes the offer
on which has been reasonably relied by the offeree. For the
elaboration on this analogy method, See Bonell supra note 300 at 170-
171.
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those specific applications can provide us with more clear
ideas about the Convention's good faith requirements. The
following illustrations of these applications are grouped
under three headings: good faith communication, good faith
mitigation, good faith cure and avoidance.
1. Good faith communication
International sales transactions are consummated
between business partners who are located usually far away
from each other in different countries. It is important to
provide the opposite party with essential information for
consummation of a sales transaction. The obligation to
communicate with another regarding all important aspects of
the contract thereby stands as a basic precept of good
318faith and fair dealing in international trade. This
requirement of good faith underlies numerous provisions
covering all stages of contract dealings.
With regard to communication during the formation of a
contract, Article 19(2) requires an offeror to notify the
offeree orally or by writing the offeree of his objection
to the modifications in the of fere's acceptance.
Article 21(2) also imposes the offeror a good faith duty to
promptly inform the offeree of whether he will regard the
acceptance effective which is delayed in the
318This communication requirement does not go to background information
on the subjective matter of the exchange.
319CISG art. 19(2) .
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transmission. 3 ' ' When the parties negotiate a contract
covering goods that are then in transit, Article 68
requires the seller to disclose transit damage that has
occurred to the goods, otherwise the seller can not take
advantage of the risk of loss rules.
During the performance stage, Article 32(1) requires
the seller to give the buyer notice of the consignment
specifying the goods which are not clearly identified to
the contract. ' ' Article 32(3), in turn, demands that the
seller who is not bound to insure the goods for the
carriage must nevertheless provide, at the buyer's request,
information necessary to enable the buyer to effect the
insurance. ' Under Article 39(1), the buyer is required to
notify the seller of any defects in the goods delivered so
that the seller can take steps to cure the defects. When
a contract contains a open term relating to specifications
that are allowed to be made by one party, Article 65
requires a buyer, who is required to make specifications,
to promptly respond to a request for missing specifications
for the goods; if the seller makes the specifications
himself, he is obliged to inform the buyer of the details
32
°Id. art. 21(2]
Id. art. 68.
i22
Id. art. 32 (1) .
323
Jd. art. 32(3)
32
*Id. art. 39(1)
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of the chosen specifications. ' In case of the impediment,
Article 79 provides that the party who fails to perform
3 2 6
must give prompt notice of his inability to perform.
Likewise, parties are also required to inform each
other of their intentions or relevant information
concerning breach, cure, avoidance of the contract. ' In
all of the aforementioned contexts, good faith
communication has been established as an affirmative duty
on contracting parties. Obviously, this duty can serve to
promote a higher standard of behavior in international
trade dealing in a cooperative manner and with concern
for each other's interests to the contract.
2. Good faith mitigation
Good faith mitigation is another important example for
applying good faith principle under the Convention. The
general rule of good faith mitigation is set forth in
Article 77. It provides that a party who relies on a
breach of contract must take reasonable measures to
mitigate the loss resulting from the breach, and failure to
Id. art. 65.
i26
Id. art. 79
21 See id. art. 26 (notice of avoidance of the contract); art. 46(3)
(request for repair); Art. 48 (communication concerning the seller's
right to cure); art. 47, 63 (communication concerning the additional
period of time for performance); art. 71 (communication concerning
suspension of performance); art. 72 (notice of avoidance of the
contract for assurance of performance); art. 88 (notice of resale of
perishable goods)
.
22a
Id. art. 77.
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mitigate is likely to result in a reduction of the
breaching party's liability for damages.
Specific applications of this duty are found in
provisions with regard to preservation of goods. Article
85 requires the seller to take reasonable steps to preserve
goods when the buyer is late in taking delivery. Article
86 impose the buyer a similar duty to preserve the
defective goods which he intends to reject. The party in
possession of the goods may arrange for storage or resale
of the goods. ' Article 88(2) demands that the preserving
party must take reasonable measures to sell the goods where
the goods are perishable or their preservation would
involve unreasonable expense. The preserving party is
also required to give reasonable notice to the other party
of his intention to sell
.
As can be seen, good faith mitigation has also been
established as an affirmative duty, which requires parties
to go "out of their way" to protect the interests of their
business partners.
229 id.
330
Id. art. 85-89.
2il
Id. art. 85.
232
Id. art. 86
321
Id. art. 87 Sc 81
22
*Id. art. 88(2)
" s
Id.
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3 . Good faith cure and avoidance
To discourage bad faith attempts to frustrate the
contract by exploiting minor defects in performance, the
Convention grants the breaching party the right to cure the
defect and save the contract. For example, Article 34
allows the seller to cure the defects in documents
relating to the transactions. ' Under Article 37, the
seller can also cure the defects in the goods before the
date for delivery. ' Even after the delivery date, the
seller may still cure any failure to perform his
obligations unless this causes unreasonable inconvenience
3 3 8
or expense to the buyer. Besides the right to cure, the
Convention further provides that the buyer who demands
performance within an additional period may not refuse to
accept the performance that he requested, or resort to any
remedy for breach of contract within that additional
period. Similarly, Article 46(3) states that any request
by buyer for repairing the defective goods must be
Id. art. 34
337
Id. art. 37
22a
Id. art. 48(1) .
Id. art. 47. See Honnold, supra note 9, at 14 7. Based on the
Convention's good faith principle, a party may not refuse performance
that he has invited because the other party can be expected to rely on
the invitation. Id. at 372. See also Article 63 where the seller is
subject to similar good faith duty as the buyer under Article 47.
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reasonable under the circumstances. These provisions
require the aggrieved party, even though he himself has no
fault with regard to the breach, to act in good faith
allowing the breaching party a reasonable chance to cure
the deficiencies in performance.
Likewise, the aggrieved party is also required to
exercise his right of avoidance in good faith. The
requirement of good faith communication discussed before is
demanded in the avoidance context. Article 26 provides that
avoidance of a contract must be notified to the other
party. Article 72 further requires the avoiding party to
give reasonable notice to the other party in order to
permit him to provide adequate assurance of his
performance. Moreover, the avoiding party must declare
the contract avoided within the reasonable time after he
became aware of the late performance or any other breach.
The above notification requirement and the limit on time
for avoidance would prevent the avoiding party from taking
3 4
Id. art. 46 (3) . This provision may discourage demands for repairs
which are motivated by a bad faith desire to charge unreasonable costs
to the seller.
3A1
Id. art. 26.
ii2
Id. art. 72.
343
Id. art. 49(2) (on the loss of the right to declare the contract
avoided by seller); Art. 64(2) (on the loss of avoidance right by
buyer)
.
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a bad faith "wait and see" posture, which may make the
344
breaching party incur unnecessary expense and risks.
For example, assume that a buyer receives the goods and intends to
avoid the contract because of non- conformity of the goods. A delay in
the buyer's declaration of avoidance will delay the seller's
opportunity to repair or redispose of the goods and will increase
expense and risk. Such delay is believed to be against the precept of
good faith and therefore may deprive the party of the right to declare
the contract avoided.
VII. CONCLUSION
As has been proven, the framework provided by the
Convention and the "common core" among national laws
support a broad interpretation of the Convention's good
faith principle. By such interpretation, good faith under
the Convention should be understood as an objective concept
which refers to the reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in international trade; its function is not merely
limited to an instrument of interpretation, but also serves
to impose a general obligation of good faith on the conduct
of the parties which extends to the performance and
enforcement of the contract, and even to the formation
conduct which is not related to the validity of the
contract. This broad reading of the Convention's good faith
makes it possible to find solution for good faith issue in
the uniform law habitat instead of national laws. This
would undoubtedly help to achieve the Convention's
fundamental goal to promote uniformity.
This broad interpretation recognizes good faith as a
general principle under the Convention. But some
Commentators are opposed of this general principle on the
ground that its generality and ambiguity will bring
101
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uncertainty and unpredictability with the law. They would
prefer more specific and focused rules because those rules
are clear and certain and would be easier for businessmen
and lawyers to get specific answers to specific questions,
while a general principle only provides a guide to a range
of possible answers and leaves the specific answer to the
judicial discretion.
Nevertheless, our society has been in full social,
economic and technical development. The methods, the
techniques, and the practices of "doing business" have
necessarily been in radically unstable and changing
status. This is especially true in the international
commercial community. Specific rules apparently can not
provide new solutions to increasing new problems which
often do not fit into the rigidity of specific rules. This
situation demands statutory rules to be drafted in a more
general and loose way so as to let the law flexibly mirror
the constant change of business practice. This legislative
technique, which originally found its way in many civil
codes, has also obtained increasing acceptance in common
law that traditionally lived with more specific and
technical rules. ' Three decades ago when speaking on the
345See supra note 16. As to the opposition to formulating good faith as
a general and broad principle, see generally Gillette supra note 59.
Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 3 9 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461,
464 (1967)
.
See supra note 42
.
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common law code- -U. C . C
.
, Professor Gilmore pointed out that
"codifying statutes which are loose, ambiguous, vague and
general are to be preferred to codifying statutes which are
tight, precise, detailed and specific."
Good faith, as a leading general principle, serves to
leave a certain leeway for courts to deal with unexpected
cases and new commercial practice. The flexibility that
results from its open-ended formulation would reduce the
rigidity of the law and thereby enable courts to do justice
to the circumstances of each particular cases. On the other
hand, the objective good faith concept requires courts to
consider the reasonable commercial standards, and it thus
can avoid the danger that judges may confuse good faith
with their judicial morality or simply indulge their
subjective whim in decision making. Moreover, with this
general principle, international business partners would be
more cautious to conduct their contractual dealings in a
way that recognizes their behavior might be examined by
judges with the reasonable standards found in their
international merchant community. This will promote higher
standards of good faith and fair dealing in international
trade. All of the above values demonstrate that good faith
is a highly desirable principle and should be well
established and developed in the uniform international
sales law.
348 ld. at 472
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The development and success of the principle of good
faith under the Convention depend in large part on the
wisdom of national judges who are granted the freedom to
exercise their discretion in applying this principle. It is
national judges' task to decide whether good faith can be
consequently developed as a uniform principle governing the
behavior of contracting parties in international sales
transactions. This task can be well fulfilled if national
judges remain true to the purpose of the Convention and
give consideration to the broad but uniform understanding
of this principle in its application.
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